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LAPSE OF PERFECTION IN SECURED
TRANSACTIONS:
A SEARCH FOR A CONSISTENT APPROACH t
BARRY L. ZARETSKY*
Under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,' a perfected secured
creditor possesses rights in personal property that are superior to those of most
other claimants of the property.' Consequently, it is important to a secured
creditor to create and maintain a perfected interest. A security interest may be
perfected by filing a financing statements or by taking possession of the col-
lateral.* Perfection also occurs automatically, in some instances, as soon as the
security interest attaches. 5
 The availability of these methods of perfection in a
t Copyright © 1981 by Boston College Law School.
' Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., 1971, New York Universi-
ty; J.D., 1974, University of Michigan.
' Unless otherwise noted, citations will be to the 1972 version of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
2 As a general rule, the secured creditor will have the right, upon the debtor's default,
to use the collateral to satisfy his claim against the debtor. See, e.g., U.C.C. S 9-201 (security
agreement generally effective between the parties, and against purchasers and creditors in-
terested in the collateral); U.C.C. 5 9-501 to 9-507 (default procedures). Unsecured creditors do
not possess such rights. U.C.C. 5 9-301(1) provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security in-
terest is subordinate to the rights of
(a) persons entitled to priority under Section 9-312; (re: priorities among con-
flicting security interests in same collateral);
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is per-
fected;
(c) in the case of goods, instruments, documents, and chattel paper, a person
who is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer
not in ordinary course of business or is a buyer of farm products in or-
dinary course of business, to the extent that he gives value and receives
delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected;
(d) in the case of accounts and general intangibles, a person who is not a
secured party and who is a transferee to the extent that he gives value
without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.
U.C.C. 5 9-301(1) (parenthetical added). The perfected secured creditor may also have rights to
fixtures that are superior to those of an owner or encumbrancer of the real estate, U.C.C.
5 9-313, and may have rights to goods which are installed in, affixed, or commingled with other
goods. U.C.C. 55 9-314, 9-315.
3 A financing statement must contain the names and addresses of the debtor and the
secured party, a description of the collateral, and the signature of the debtor. U.C.C. 5 9-402(1).
Rules concerning the proper place to file a financing statement are found in 5 9-401 (intrastate)
and 5 9.103 (interstate).
U.C.C. S 9-305.
3 Under section 9-203(1) and 9-203(2), a security interest attaches when it becomes en-
forceable against the debtor. This occurs when the secured party has possession of the collateral
or the debtor has signed a security agreement, and value has been given and the debtor has rights
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particular transaction depends upon such factors as the type of collatera1, 6 the
purpose of the transaction,' and the nature of the parties involved.°
Once the creditor has perfected his security interest, he must then guard
against a lapse of perfection. While such a lapse can occur in a variety of ways,
the most common situation involves the expiration of the five-year period dur-
ing which financing statements are effective. 9 Perfection also may lapse after
the goods are moved to another jurisdiction, '° or because a period of temporary
perfection expires." Finally, perfection by possession lapses as soon as the
secured party surrenders his possession of the collateral.' 2
When perfection lapses, third parties who normally take priority over an
unperfected secured creditor will seek priority over the lapsed secured creditor,
now considered unperfected. These third parties typically will be either pur-
in the collateral. No action is required to perfect an attached security interest in the following
situations:
(a) a security interest in collateral in possession of the secured party under Section
9-305;
(b) a security interest temporarily perfected in instruments or documents without
delivery under Section 9-304 or in proceeds for a ten day period under Section
9-306;
(c) a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust or
a decedent's estate;
(d) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is required
for a motor vehicle required to be registered; and fixture filing is required for
priority over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided in Section
9-313;
(e) an assignment of accounts which does not alone or in conjunction with other
assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding
accounts of the assignor;
(f) a security interest of a collecting bank (Section 4-208) or arising under the Ar-
ticle on Sales (see Section 9-113) or covered in subsection (3) of this section;
(g) an assignment for the benefit of all the creditors of the transferor, and subse-
quent transfers by the assignee thereunder.
U.C.C. S 9-302(1)(a)-(g).
6 For example, a security interest in money or instruments can only be perfected by
possession except in certain temporary perfection situations. U.C.C. S 9-304(1). A security in-
terest in accounts or general intangibles may only be perfected by filing. U.C.C. 55 9-302,9-305,
Comment 1.
For example, perfection by possession would be inappropriate in a transaction in
which the debtor needs to be able to use the collateral. In addition, the temporary automatic
perfection of S 9-304(5) is available only when collateral is returned to the debtor for particular
purposes.
For example, when the debtor is a consumer, automatic perfection of a purchase
money security interest is available. U.C.C. S 9-302(1)(d).
9 U.C.C. 5 9-403(2). The financing statement is effective for five years from the date
of filing. Id.
i° U.C.C. 5 9-103.
" See, e.g. ,U.C.C. 5 9-103(1)(d) (reperfection required after goods moved to new juris-
diction); SS 9-304(4), 9-304(5), 9-304(6) (action required to continue perfection in instruments,
negotiable documents and collateral in possession of a bailee beyond the twenty-one-day grace
period); 5 9.306(3) (perfection action may be required to continue perfection beyond ten-day
automatic period).
12 U.C.C. 5 9-305.
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chasers" or lien creditors.' 4
 In some situations, the Code is explicit on the ef-
fect of the lapse. For instance, according to the Code, the lapse invariably
destroys the secured creditor's rights as a perfected secured creditor against
parties whose interests arise subsequent to the lapse." In such a situation, the
creditor is simply treated as an unperfected secured creditor. Further, the Code
provides that when a party whose interest arose before the lapse had priority
over the secured creditor before the lapse, the party retains priority.' 6 When a
party was subordinate to the secured creditor before the lapse and would have
priority over an unperfected secured creditor, however, the Code offers no single
response to the question of what effect lapse has on the third party. Instead, the
Code indicates that the effect of lapse will depend on the cause of the lapse and
the types of parties involved." In certain variations of this last situation, the
impact of a lapse on third parties is quite clear under the Code," but in other
variations of this scenario, the Code provides little or no guidance on the effect
of a perfection lapse.' 9
On the face of the statute, there appears to be little justification for the dif-
ferent treatment accorded various types of lapse situations. Furthermore, the
lack of a consistent theoretical approach to lapse means that there is no logical
way to dispose of lapse problems arising under sections in which the Code is
unclear about the proper resolutions. Consequently, after presenting the
Code's treatment of lapse of perfection, temporary automatic perfection, and
grace periods, this article will attempt to discover a consistent theme in the
Code's approach to these areas. To the extent that such an approach cannot be
found, it will propose changes that treat these related problems in a fair and
uniform manner. More specifically, Part I of the article will describe the situa-
tions in which lapse, temporary automatic perfection, or grace period issues
arise and explain the applicable Code sections. Part II will analyze the prob-
lems that must be addressed in any approach to lapse. Part III will propose a
" A purchaser is one who takes by purchase. U.C.C. 5 1-201(33). Purchase is defined
as "taking by sate, discount, negotiation mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any
other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." U.C.C. 1-201(32). Although the
definition includes taking by lien, this is modified by the words "any other voluntary
transaction" and, therefore, would seem to encompass only consensual lien creditors, i.e.,
secured creditors, and not involuntary lien creditors. See, e.g., Mazer v. Williams Bros. Co., 461
Pa. 587, 337 A.2d 559 (1975).
" A lien creditor is one who "has acquired a lien on the property involved by attach-
ment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assign-
ment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition or a receiver in equity
from the time of appointment." U.C.C. 9-301(3).
" See, e.g., U.C.C. 5 9-403(2) ("Upon lapse, the security interest becomes unper-
fected . . . .").
U.C.C. 5 9-201.
" See text in Part I infra.
See, e.g., U.C.C. 5 9-403(2) (purchasers and lien creditors promoted upon lapse); §
9-103(1)(d) (purchaser promoted upon lapse); § 9-103(2) (non-professional bona fide purchaser
for value promoted upon lapse). See text at notes 20-79 & 96-114 infra.
19 See, e.g., U.C.C. 9-103(1)(d) (no guidance as to rights of lien creditor); 5 9-103(1)
(c) (rights of third parties); 5 9-103(2) (rights of professional buyers and lienors); 5 9-305 (rights
of third parties); 5 9-306(3) (rights of third parties); § 9.304 (rights of third parties).
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unified approach to lapse issues under the Code, and will illustrate its applica-
tion to the different lapse situations.
I. THE PROBLEM SITUATIONS
A. Lapse Issues
1. Lapse Under Section 9-403(2)
Section 9-403(2) of the Code deals with the lapse of perfection in situations
where the security interest was perfected by the filing of a financing statement.
Under this section, a financing statement is effective for five years from the
date of filing. 20 At the end of the five-year period, the effectiveness of the filing
lapses unless a continuation statement has been filed within six months prior to
the end of the period. 2 ' The continuation statement "must be signed by the
secured party, identify the original statement by file number and state that the
original statement is still effective. " 22 The continuation statement differs from
the original financing statement since it contains none of the information in-
cluded in the original statement. It acts merely as a reference document. 23
Article 9's treatment of a lapse in the effectiveness of a financing statement
was changed with the evolution of the Code. An early draft of article 9 con-
tained a section which provided that upon lapse, a security interest "becomes
unperfected, with regard to rights in the collateral which accrue after such
lapse . . . . "24 Under this language, a junior purchaser or lien creditor would
not gain priority upon lapse of the senior secured party's filing. Rather, the
respective rights would be frozen as of the time that the junior interest arose.
The only parties who could take priority over the secured creditor were those
whose interests arose after the lapse and who could defeat an unperfected
security interest. 25
This approach was consistent with the treatment of lapse in most jurisdic-
tions prior to the passage of the Code. For example, in In re Andrews26 appellant
20 U.C.C. S 9-403(2). The 1962 version of 5 9-403(2) provided, in addition to the five-
year rule, that a "filed financing statement which states a maturity date of the obligation secured
of five years or less is effective until such maturity date and thereafter for a period of sixty days."
This provision proved to be a trap for the unwary, see, e.g., In re Cohen, 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 22
(E.D. Pa. 1967), served no useful purpose, and was eliminated in the 1972 revisions. The sixty-
day grace period for filing a continuation statement, which was available if a maturity date five
years or less was stated, also was eliminated in the 1972 revisions.
U.C.C. 55 9-403(2), 9-403(3). Under the 1962 version, if the financing statement
stated a maturity date of five years or less, there was a sixty-day grace period after the expiration
date within which a continuation statement could be filed without a lapse.
22 U.C.C. 5 9-403(3). If the original secured party has assigned his interest and the
assignee signs the continuation statement, a separate statement of assignment is required. Id. See
U.C.C. 5 9-405.
22 Cf. U.C.C. S 9-402(1) (financing statement need contain only names and addresses
of debtor or secured party, description of collateral and debtor's signature).
24 See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code (1950 Revisions) (emphasis added).
25 See note 2 supra.
26 172 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1949).
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held a chattel mortgage dated November 22, 1943 and properly filed on
November 30, 1943. On November 12, 1946, appellee took a chattel mortgage
on the same property and recorded it on November 14, 1946. Under the ap-
plicable Indiana statute," appellant's filing was only effective for three years,
after which time her mortgage would lapse unless she filed an extension state-
ment. The statute provided, inter alia, that "[a] chattel mortgage executed
under and pursuant to this act shall be invalid as against . . junior mort-
gagees . . "28 if an extension statement is not filed before expiration (three
years). Since appellant did not file an extension statement until March 17,
1947, her mortgage lapsed on November 30, 1946. The federal Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Indiana statute did not promote an
existing junior mortgagee upon lapse of a senior interest. 29
 It compared the In-
diana statute to a Wisconsin statute" that invalidated lapsed mortgages as
against "subsequent mortgages" and had been interpreted as providing ab-
solute priority for the mortgagee. 3 ' The Andrews court reasoned that "junior"
and "subsequent" are sufficiently close in meaning that the same result should
occur under both statutes." It also noted that this absolute priority rule
represented the majority view. 33 While the Andrews court's reasoning is ques-
tionable," the case illustrates the strong preference in pre-Code cases for an
absolute priority rule.
The 1956 draft of the Code did not contain the language concerning the
rights of competing interests that had been in the 1952 version. It merely stated
that upon lapse the security interest becomes unperfected." Professor Gilmore,
one of the drafters who preferred an absolute priority rule, suggested in his
treatise that since the 1956 draft did not explicitly note the deletion, it may
27
 1933 IND. CODE ANN. 5 51-515 (Burns 1947 Cum. Supp.).
28
 172 F.2d at 997 (quoting Indiana Chattel Mortgage Act, 1933 IND. CODE ANN. 5
51-515 (Burns 1947 Cum. Supp.)).
29
 172 F.2d at 999.
38 WIS. STAT. 5 241.11 (Brossard 1927).
3 ' 172 F.2d at 998-99.
32 Id. at 999.
33 m
34
 The court's reasoning is questionable at best. The "subsequent" mortgagee referred
to in the Wisconsin statute could have been one who arose subsequent to the mortgage that even-
tually lapsed or subsequent to the lapse. That statute was interpreted as meaning subsequent to
the lapse so that the rights of parties whose interest arose prior to the lapse were frozen. Graham
v. Perry, 200 Wis. 211, 215-17, 228 N.W. 135, 137 (1929). On the other hand, a "junior" mort-
gagee must have obtained his mortgage while a senior interest was effective since otherwise there
would be nothing to be junior to. Arguably, the word junior could denote a mortgagee who
would have been junior but for the lapse. This, however, could easily be covered by other
language in the statute. Therefore, the language was probably intended to promote formerly
junior mortgagees upon lapse.
The court's questionable reasoning, complete with citation to Funk and Wagnall's New
Standard Dictionary, but also with citations to Jones on Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgage
for the general rule, would seem to indicate the strong pull towards an absolute priority rule that
existed prior to the U.C.C.
" U.C.C. 5 9-403(2) (1956 version). But see Braucher, Book Review, U. CHI. L. REV.
890, 892-94 (1966).
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have been simply a "typist's or typesetter's error." 36 Gilmore conceded,
however, that the comments, which first appeared after the 1956 draft, quite
clearly indicated an intent by the drafters to promote a junior interest over a
senior, lapsed interest." Justice Braucher, another drafter, disputed Gilmore's
"typist" theory and asserted that the drafters made a conscious decision to pro-
mote the junior interest upon lapse of the senior interest." In view of these con-
flicting stories by those who were present at the deliberations, an attempt to
determine where the truth lies is beyond the scope of this article.
The 1956 version of section 9-403(2) was retained in the 1962 Code as was
the comment calling for promotion of the junior interest upon lapse of the
senior interest's perfection. Undaunted, Professor Gilmore continued to assert
that this section could be interpreted to provide absolute priority to the lapsed
secured creditor." He argued that in a priority dispute between a lien which
arose prior to lapse and a lapsed security interest, the filing ought to constitute
constructive knowledge. Moreover, he contended that such knowledge should
be sufficient to defeat the lien creditor under section 9-301(1)(b)." This,
however, requires substantial bending of the Code's distinction between
knowledge and notice. Under the Code, knowledge means actual knowledge,"
while notice means reason to know." Since section 9-301(1)(b) requires knowl-
edge, it would seem to require that the lien creditor actually be aware of the
financing statement or the security interest before he could be defeated by an
unperfected secured creditor. Gilmore maintained, however, that the
knowledge requirement in section 9-301 was not intended to cover lapsed
security interests since in the typical unperfected security interest situation
there is no filing and, consequently, no notice." Therefore, knowledge would
be the proper term. Since lapse is an atypical situation, Gilmore argued,
knowledge should be interpreted more broadly so that it would include notice
of a lapsed security interest." This interpretation would permit a lapsed senior
secured creditor to defeat a lien that arose prior to the lapse. Unfortunately,
Gilmore's approach also plays havoc with the Code's knowledge-notice distinc-
tion.
In a priority dispute between a prior-filed, lapsed security interest and a
later-filed security interest, Gilmore claimed that the language of section
9-312(5)(a) merely gives the prior-filed interest priority over a later one, and
36 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 589 n.4 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
" Id. U.C.C. 9-403, Comment 3 (1962 version). Cf. U.C.C. 5 9-103, Comment 7
(1962 version) (junior interest promoted over secured creditor whose perfection lapses four
months after collateral moved to another jurisdiction).
'8 Braucher, Book Review, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 890, 893 (1966); 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS
258-59 (1971).
39 GILMORE, supra note 36, at 590.
4° Id.
" U.C.C. 5 1-201(25).
42 U.C.C. 5 1-201(27).
43 GILMORE, supra note 36, at 593.
44 GILMORE, supra note 36, at 590-92.
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does not deal with the lapse problem." Consequently a lapsed secured creditor
could defeat a later-filed secured creditor if the later filing was made prior to
the lapse. He made no attempt, however, to reconcile this with that section's
requirement that both security interests be perfected by filing. In the lapse situa-
tion, only one interest, the junior one, is perfected at the time of the dispute
and, arguably, section 9-312(5)(a) 45 does not apply. If so, section 9-312(5)(b) 47
would apply and the later-filed interest would have priority." Alternatively, it
could be argued that the section only requires that both security interests were
at some time perfected by filing and that once this condition is met, priority is
determined in the order of filing. Again, this requires considerable stretching of
the statutory language and it is unlikely that this is what the drafters intended.
Those few courts that have considered the 1962 version of section 9-403(2)
have followed Comment 3." Thus, they refused to accord a lapsed secured
creditor absolute priority over a prelapse claimant. To ensure the continuation
of this interpretation, the section was amended in 1972 to state that a security
interest that becomes unperfected as a result of a lapsed filing "is deemed to
have been unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser or lien
creditor before lapse."" This revision made it clear that upon lapse, formerly
subordinate interests are promoted and take priority over the lapsed secured
creditor. This meshes nicely with the deletion of the knowledge provision in
section 9-301(1)(b). Under the 1962 Code, a lien creditor with actual
knowledge of a security interest would be subordinate to the secured creditor
even if the security interest was unperfected." Even a lapsed security interest
would have priority over a lien creditor with knowledge of it. Moreover, Com-
ment 3 to section 9-403 would apply only if the subordinate lien creditor had no
knowledge of the security interest, and only then would he be promoted over
the earlier security interest.
In revising the 1962 Code, there was some disagreement between the Arti-
cle 9 Review Committee and the Permanent Editorial Board over the inclusion
of lien creditors in the parties who could be promoted upon the lapse of a
security interest under 9-403(2). 52 A preliminary revision of section 9-403
43 Id.
♦° U.C.C. 5 9.312(5)(a) (1962 version).
U.C.C. $ 9-312(5)(6) (1962 version).
+8 Id. The later filed interest would be the only perfected interest at the time of the
dispute.
49 See, e.g., United States v. Squires, 378 F. Supp. 798, 805 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Cf.
Mastan Co. v. Orax Realty Corp., 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1076, 1078-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)
(lapsed security interest retains priority over junior security interest since junior creditor had ac-
tual knowledge of senior interest prior to lapse); Stearns Mfg. Co. v. National Bank & Trust Co.
of Central Pennsylvania, 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV, 189, 192-93 (Pa. Corn. Pleas 1972); General
Electric Credit Corp. v. Isaacs, 90 Wash. 2d 234, 581 P.2d 1032 (1978); Morse Electro Products
Corp. v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Co., 90 Wash. 2d 195, 579 P.2d 1341, 1343-44 (1978).
3° U.C.C. 5 9-403(2).
31 U.C.C. 5 9-301(1)(b) (1962 version).
32 R. H ENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
81-82 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as HENSONI.
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stated that upon lapse, a security interest "is subordinate to conflicting claims
as if it had never been perfected." 53 This was later changed to provide that
upon lapse, the security interest becomes unperfected against a purchaser
whose interest arose before the lapse." The Permanent Editorial Board added,
the lien creditor language." Under the 1972 version, then, the lien creditor's
knowledge is irrelevant in determining his priority under section 9-301(1)(b)
and section 9-403(2). Accordingly he will be promoted automatically upon
lapse. This reasoning also applies when the competing party is another secured
creditor. Under section 9-312(5)," knowledge is irrelevant in a priority dispute
between two secured creditors. A junior secured creditor will, therefore, be
promoted automatically upon lapse of a senior security interest.
It is interesting to note that this reasoning does not hold for a buyer not in
the ordinary course of business, a bulk transferee, or a buyer of farm products
in the ordinary course of business. Rather, section 9-301(1)(c) denies priority
over an unperfected security interest if they have knowledge of the interest at
the time they receive delivery of the collateral." Even though the security in-
terest is deemed to have been unperfected as against a person who became a
purchaser . . . before lapse"" these parties will remain subordinate to the
lapsed interest if they have knowledge of it." Further, if one accepts Professor
Gilmore's tenuous transmutation of knowledge into notice, the lapse rule of
section 9-403(2) is nullified when these parties are involved.
83 Preliminary Report No. 2 of the Review Committee on Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
25 Bus. LAW. 1069, 1133 (1970).
84 HENSON, supra note 52, at 81-82.
"
" Section 9-312(5) provides:
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including cases of
purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special priorities set
forth in subsection (3) and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting security
interests in the same collateral shall be determined according to the following
rules:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the
collateral or the time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is
earlier, provided that there is no period thereafter when there is neither fil-
ing nor perfection.
(b) So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first to attach
has priority.
Id.
" Specifically, $ 9-301(1)(c) provides that an unperfected secured party is subordinate
to:
in the case of goods, instruments, documents and chattel paper, a person who is
not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in ordinary
products in ordinary course of business, to the extent that he gives value and
receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected.
Id.
U.C.C. 5 9-403(2).
89 U.C.C. $ 9-301(1)(c).
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2. Lapse Under Section 9-103
a. Section 9-103(1)(d)
In addition to the lapse problems that exist under section 9-403(2), lapse
issues can also arise under section 9-103, the choice of law section in article 9. 60
Section 9-103(1)(d) provides in general that when goods subject to a perfected
security interest in one state are moved to another state, perfection continues in
the second state for four months. Under this provision, lapse of perfection can
occur in two instances. First, when perfection in the first state would have
lapsed prior to the end of the four-month period, it will lapse in the second state
unless action is taken prior to the lapse in the first state. 6 ' Second, following the
four-month period, if some action such as filing is required to perfect the
security interest, perfection continues only if the action is taken in the new
jurisdiction. If perfection does lapse as a result of goods being moved from one
state to another, the security interest is deemed unperfected as against a pur-
chaser who purchased after removal but prior to the lapse. 62
A difficult issue here concerns the effect of a failure to reperfect, within the
four-month period, security interests that arose during the period. For exam-
ple, if goods subject to a perfected security interest in state X are removed to
state Y on January 1, perfection continues for four months without any action
on the part of the secured creditor. If B buys the goods on March 1, he buys
goods that are subject to a perfected security interest.° Similarly, if S takes a
security interest or L gets a lien on the goods on March 1, they do so subject to
the prior perfected security interest." If the prior secured creditor does not re-
perfect by May 1, the parties' rights can be frozen as of March 1. Therefore,
even though the earlier security interest is now unperfected, it can retain priori-
ty over competing interests that arose before May 1. Alternatively, the com-
peting interests can be promoted and take priority over the lapsed interest.
6° U.C.C. 5 9-103 is entitled "Perfection of Security Interest in Multiple State Trans-
actions."
61
 U.C.C. 5 9-103(1)(d). This corrects a problem in prior versions, that would have
permitted an extension of the period of perfection merely by moving the collateral to another
jurisdiction.
" U.C.C. S 9-103(1)(d)(i). Section 9-103 has a long and sometimes rocky drafting
history. The four-month rule and its approach to lapse, however, have not had quite as much dif-
ficulty as the rest of the section. From the 1950 revisions through the 1972 version, the Code pro-
vided that perfection of a security interest continues for four months after removal of the col-
lateral. Thereafter, the interest may be reperfected in the new state.
63
 U.C.C. 5 9-201 (general validity of security agreement against purchasers of col-
lateral); U.C.C. 5 9-301(1)(c) (see note 57 supra for the text of this provision). The hypothetical
assumes that he is not a buyer in the ordinary course of business (who takes free of a perfected
security interest even if he has knowledge of its existence under S 9-307(1)). Section 1-201(9)
defines a buyer in the ordinary course of business as "a person who in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third
party in goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind
but does not include a pawnbroker."
64 U.C.C. S 9-201 (see note 63 supra for the text of this provision); 5 9-312(5) (secured
creditor); 5 9-301(1)(b) (lien creditor).
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Prior to 1972, the Code offered no guidance as to which approach was en-
visioned. Professor Gilmore preferred the absolute priority approach, which
freezes the parties' rights as of the time. their interests arose." He argued that
only parties whose interests arose after the four-month period had run could
defeat the earlier security interest. 66 This argument was consistent with
Gilmore's approach to lapse under section 9-403(2). Indeed, unlike cases con-
cerning section 9-403(2), a majority of cases construing the 1962 version of sec-
tion 9-103(1)(d) followed this absolute priority approach. 67
Nevertheless, the absolute priority approach was rejected in Comment 7
to section 9-103 in the 1962 Code. This comment stated that if the secured
party fails to reperfect within four months after removal of the goods, his in-
terest "is subject to defeat here by those persons who take priority over an un-
perfected security interest (see section 9-301). Under section 9-312(5) the
holder of a perfected conflicting security interest is such a person .. . ."65
Although the precise meaning of Comment 7 is unclear, the drafters apparent-
ly intended that both purchasers and lien creditors whose interests arose during
6' GILMORE, supra note 36, at 627.
66 Id.
" One case compared the concept of continuous perfection as embodied in section
9.103 with that of a grace period, and noted that while a grace period clearly provides only condi-
tional priority (the condition being perfection before the end of the period), continuous perfection
implies absolute priority until lapse. Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 A.D.2d
560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570, 577-78 (1962). Other cases looked to pre-Code cases which generally
provided absolute priority over subordinate prelapse interests. The following cases follow the ab-
solute protection version: Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Dinner, 302 F. Supp, 897, 899
(ID. Colo. 1969); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 54 Ala. App.
188, 306 So. 2d 277, 279 (1974); Pascack Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Ritar Ford, Inc., 6 Conn.
Cir. Ct. 489, 276 A.2d 800, 807 (1970); American State Bank v. White, 217 Kan. 78, 535 P.2d
424, 430-31 (1975); Community Credit Co. v. Gillham, 191 Neb. 198, 214 N.W.2d 384, 389
(1974); First Nat'l Bank of Bayshore v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162, 169 (1966);
Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 A.D.2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570, 577-78
(1962); Newton-Waltham Bank & Trust Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 68 Misc. 2d 228, 231, 327
N.Y.S.2d 77, 81 (1971), aff'd, 75 Misc. 2d 103, 347 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1972); Al Maroone Ford,
Inc. v. Manheim Auto Auction, Inc., 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 154, 208 A.2d 290, 291 (1965); First
Bristol County Nat'l Bank v. Shirley, 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 378, 381-82 (Tenn. App. 1972);
Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 454 S.W.2d 465, 483 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 465 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1971). The following commentators
assert that section 9-103(3) gives four months of absolute protection, although not all agree that
that is the better rule: 4 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 9-103:16 (2d ed.
1970); GILMORE, supra note 36, at 626-27; Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REV.
477, 535 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Coogan]; Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the
UCC - Part 6: Conflicts of Laws and Multistate Transactions, 77 Com. L.J. 145, 150-51 (1972);
Headrick, The New Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code: An Introduction and Critique, 34
MONT. L. REV. 218, 240 (1973); Weintraub, Choice of Law In Secured Personal Property Transactions:
The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 MICH. L. REV. 684, 712-13 (1970); Note,
Resolving Conflicts Arising From the Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: The Original UGC 5 9-103 and
Its Successor, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.. 990, 992 n.8 & 996 n.27 (1974). The following commentators sup-
port the conditional-protection version of 5 9-103(3): J. WHITE & B. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE UAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 849 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE &
SUMMERS, 1st ed.]; Vernon, Recorded Chattel Security Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 47 IOWA L.
REV. 346, 377-78 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Vernon]. See also U.C.C. 5 9-103, Comment 7
(1962 version),
U.C.C. 9-103, Coment 7 (1962 version).
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the four-month period would become senior to a secured creditor who fails to
reperfect before the end of the period. The reference to section 9-301 within
Comment 7 suggests an intention to include lien creditors within the ambit of
the statement, even though the subsequent example in the comment concerns
only competing security interests. 69
 If lien creditors were not to be included in
the comment, it presumably would mention only section 9-312. Therefore, it
appears that although the 1962 Code itself is silent on the question of absolute
versus conditional priority under the four-month rule, conditional priority over
both purchasers and lien creditors was intended.
Most commentators considering the issue have favored the approach of
Comment 7. 70
 They have argued that the prior perfected secured party should
retain priority over parties whose interests arose during the four-month period
only if the security interest is reperfected before the end of the period.'' If it is
not reperfected, they claim that the junior parties should be promoted over the
secured creditor." It was thought that a secured creditor should have some
duty to police his collateral, and that four months is sufficient time for a
secured creditor to learn that his collateral has been moved and to file in the
new jurisdiction."
The 1972 Code directly addresses the question of absolute versus condi-
tional priority during the four-month period, at least with respect to purchasers
whose interests arise during the period. Section 9-103(1)(d) states that there is
no absolute priority over a purchaser. 74
 Consequently, a purchaser who is sub-
ordinate to a secured creditor during the four-month period takes priority if the
secured party fails to reperfect before the end of the period. The Code makes
no mention, however, of the status of a lien creditor whose interest arises dur-
ing the four-month period. This omission could be interpreted as indicating an
intention to treat secured creditor-lien creditor disputes as they apparently
were treated under Comment 7 to section 9-103 in the 1962 version: that is,
giving the secured creditor conditional priority over the lien creditor. Never-
theless, there are three strong reasons for according the secured party absolute
priority over lien creditors during the four-month period. First, from a com-
parison of section 9-103 and section 9-403 in the 1972 Code, it is obvious that
when the drafters wanted to eliminate absolute priority over lien creditors, as
they did in section 9-403, they knew how to do so. Because they failed to men-
tion lien creditors in section 9-103, it is conceivable that they intended to pro-
vide absolute priority for them." In addition, the discussion of sections 9-103
and 9-403 in the 1971 ALI Proceedings indicates that the drafters made a con-
scious decision to treat lapse differently in the two sections, largely because of
" See also WHITE & SUMMERS, 1st ed., supra note 67, at 849.
7° See, e.g., Vernon, supra note 67, at 378; HENSON, supra note 52, at 221-22; WHITE &
SUMMERS, 1 st ed., supra note 67, at 848-50.
" See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, 1st ed., supra note 44, at 848-50.
72 Id.
" Id.
U .C.C. $ 9-103(1)(d).
75 "The Committee proposes in .. 9-103(1)(d)(i) . .. to make clear that after the
lapse purchasers — i.e., buyers and secured parties — have priority over the lapsed security in-
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projected problems with the trustee in bankruptcy. 76 The drafters were con-
cerned that if the secured creditor's priority over a lien creditor during the four-
month period under section 9-103 was not absolute, the security interest could
be defeated by a bankruptcy trustee anytime the goods were moved interstate
and reperfection occurred within four months of bankruptcy." Lastly, much of
the case law under the 1962 version of the Code, which took no position on the
absolute priority issue, accorded secured creditors absolute priority over
creditors who obtained liens during the four-month period." Although the
drafters probably did not favor those cases, they were undoubtedly aware of
them. Thus the failure to mention lien creditors in section 9-103 permits a con-
tinuation of the interpretation adopted by those cases." In summary, the 1962
version of section 9-103(1)(d) did not address the issue of conditional versus ab-
solute priority under the four-month rule. Comment 7, however, indicated the
drafters' intent to grant the secured creditor conditional priority over both pur-
chasers and lien creditors. In contrast to the silence of the 1962 Code, the 1972
version specifically states that a secured creditor who has failed to reperfect has
only conditional priority over purchasers whose interests arose during the four-
month period. The 1972 Code does not focus on the issue of the secured
creditor versus lien creditor, but strong reasons exist for assuming that under
the 1972 version of section 9-103(1)(d) the secured creditor has absolute priori-
ty over a lien creditor.
b. Section 9-103(1)(c)
Section 9-103(1)(c) is another Code provision under which lapse problems
may arise. According to this section, where the parties understand at the time
of attachment of a purchase money security interest in goods that the goods are
to be used in another jurisdiction, the law of the other jurisdiction governs for
thirty days after the debtor receives possession, and thereafter if the goods are
taken to the new jurisdiction within the thirty days." Thus, if the parties to a
terest. The negative inference is that judgment lienors remain subordinate." Review Committee
for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code, Final Report (April 25, 1971) at 245, quoted in Coogan, supra note 67, at 535.
76 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 255-61 (1971). See text at notes 162-201 infra.
" See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 5 60(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. 5 96(a)(2) (1976), Bankrupt-
cy Reform Act of 1978, 5 547(e)(1)(B), 11 U.S.C. S 547(e)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1978). The new
Bankruptcy Code has reduced the preference period to ninety days in most instances. But see
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 5 547(b)(4)(B), 11 U.S.C. 5 547(b)(4)(B) (Supp. II 1978)
(preference period one year for insiders).
76 See cases cited in note 67 supra.
79 See Coogan, supra note 67, at 535-36.
80 Section 9-103(1)(c) states:
If the parties to a transaction creating a purchase money security interest in goods
in one jurisdiction understand at the time that the security interest attaches that
the goods will be kept in another jurisdiction, then the law of the other jurisdiction
governs the perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of the security
interest from the time it attaches until thirty days after the debtor receives posses-
sion of the goods and thereafter if the goods are taken to the other jurisdiction
before the end of the thirty-day period.
Id.
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purchase money security interest understand that the goods will be utilized in
another jurisdiction and the secured party files in that jurisdiction, he will be
perfected for at least thirty days after the debtor receives possession of the
goods. 8 ' If the goods are not taken to the new jurisdiction before the end of the
thirty-day period, the perfection will lapse." Comment 3 to section 9-103 notes
that "thereafter the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is controls per-
fection." 83
The effect of this lapse of perfection in the "new jurisdiction" upon a
creditor who purchased or levied on the goods during the thirty-day period is
unclear. For example, suppose P takes a purchase money security interest in
goods in New York that the parties understand will be used in California. P
files in California as required by section 9-103(1)(c). Ten days after the debtor
receives possession of the goods, P gives B bank a non-purchase money security
interest and B properly files in New York. The goods fail to reach California
within thirty days after the debtor received possession. At the time of B bank's
purchase, or of a levy if B were a lien creditor, the purchasing or levying
creditor is clearly subordinate to the secured creditor." Section 9-103(1)(c)
gives no indication whether the rights are frozen as of that time or whether the
subordinate interest is promoted upon lapse of perfection. An analogy to sec-
tion 9-403 suggests that the subordinate interest is promoted upon the lapse of
perfection. No basis exists, however, for analogizing to section 9-403 other
et Id.
82 Id. "Further, this section uses the concepts that goods are kept in a state or brought
into a state, and related terms. These concepts imply a stopping place of a permanent nature in
the state, not merely transit or storage inteded to be transitory." U.C.C. 5 9-103, Comment 3.
ea The comment notes that one way to avoid this lapse is to file in both the original
and the intended new jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this may create problems under the last event
test of S 9-103(1)(b). For example, suppose D buys goods in New York that are to be used in
California and gives A a purchase money security interest in the goods. A files in both New York
and California. The law of California governs for 30 days, but if the goods fail to arrive in
California within that period, California law ceases to govern. Now suppose the goods do not ar-
rive in California in time, and in fact are in Kansas on a railroad siding when the 30-day period
expires. In deciding which state's law takes over at that time one can argue that the "last event"
is the expiration of the 30-day period and a filing in Kansas would be proper. Yet New York law
might apply because while the goods were in New York, the four requisites for a perfected securi-
ty interest agreement, value, rights in collateral, attachment under 9-203, and filing if required
for perfection under 9-302 were met. This latter approach, favoring New York law, is the one
that the Code drafters intended, particularly in light of Comment 3 to section 9-103. Since
California law governed at that point, however, it is difficult to reach such a result under the
language of the Code.
If the goods simply remain in New York, a similar problem arises. At the time of the filing in
New York, California law governed so the New York filing could have no effect. At the end of the
30-day period, the only "event" that occurs is that California law ceases to govern. Unless this is
considered an "event" under S 9-103(1)(b), a new filing in New York may be required at the end
of the 30-day period. This, however, would duplicate the earlier filing. Hopefully, any court
faced with such an unusual fact situation would look to substance over form and find the original
New York filing sufficient. Cf. Coogan, supra note 67, at 537-44 (other problems with "last
event" test).
a* U.C.C. S 9-201 (general validity of security agreement against, inter alia, purchasers
and creditors); S 9-301 (rights of lien creditor); S 9-312 (priorities among conflicting security in-
terests in same collateral).
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than that both sections involve some type of lapse of perfection. The analogy
might more properly be made to section 9-103(1)(d) because, like section 9-103
(1)(c), it involves multiple-state transactions. Such an analogy would lead to
the promotion of a subordinate purchaser but not a lien creditor." Neverthe-
less, the two sections deal with very different issues and there is little reason be-
yond convenience to apply the same lapse rule to both sections. In addition,
analogizing to either section 9-403(2) or section 9-103(1)(d) is difficult because
section 9-103(1)(c) contains none of the language of the other sections concern-
ing the rights of intervening parties. It is possible, of course, that this is merely
an oversight on the part of the Code drafters. The fact remains, however, that
the language is not present. Thus, a priority dispute under section 9-103(1)(c)
should not be resolved by reference to sections 9-403(2) or 9-103(1)(d).
Fortunately, the type of lapse problem presented by section 9-103(1)(c)
and described above is in most instances unlikely to arise because it would re-
quire a proper filing in the new jurisdiction, no filing in the original jurisdic-
tion, a finding that the goods didn't arrive in the new jurisdiction within thirty
days after the debtor received possession, and a purchase or levy during that
thirty-day period. The ease of the filing rules makes a proper filing likely in
most cases. Furthermore, the debtor often will not even receive possession until
the goods arrive in the new, jurisdiction. The thirty-day period does not begin
to run until that time and the secured creditor will be continuously perfected in
the new jurisdiction. There are several situations, however, in which a lapse
problem under section 9-103(1)(c) is probable. The first of these occurs when a
debtor receives possession in the original jurisdiction and takes responsibility
for shipment to the new location. In that case, there is a greater likelihood that
before the goods arrive in the new jurisdiction, the debtor might sell them or
borrow against them or a creditor might levy on the goods. If the debtor sells
the goods, they probably will never reach the new jurisdiction, causing a lapse
in perfection after the thirty-day period has expired. Similarly, if a creditor
levies on goods after the debtor receives possession but before they arrive in the
new jurisdiction, the levying creditor might be able to prevent the goods from
completing their journey within thirty days, also causing a lapse in perfection.
A lien creditor can accomplish this because a levy generally involves taking
physical possession of the goods, 86 even where his lien is subordinate to the
security interest at the time of the levy. 87 Although it seems inequitable to per-
mit a lien creditor to gain priority through such a dilatory practice, the Code
Comments accept the possibility that a levying creditor can extinguish the
secured creditor's perfection by preventing the goods from reaching the new
jurisdiction on time. 88 Adopting an absolute priority approach would avoid this
" See text at notes 74-79 supra.
" See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 488.320(a) (West Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT.
ANN. SS 550.12, 570.05 (West 1947); cf. McKearn v. Stevens, 321 Mass. 646, 648, 75 N.E.2d 1,
2 (1947) (failure to physically seize moveable goods invalidates levy).
" U.C.C. S 9-301(1)(b).
86 See, e.g., U.C.C. S 9-103, Comment 3.
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problem at least as between the secured creditor and the levying creditor, by
freezing the secured creditor's priority as of the date of the levy.
Two other situations in which a lapse problem arises under section 9-103
(1)(c) involve disputes between two secured creditors. For example, one
creditor, S, may have a floating lien on the debtor's inventory or equipment
and a second creditor, P, may take a purchase money security interest in in-
ventory or equipment under facts that fall under section 9-103(1)(c). In most
instances, P will perfect immediately, giving notice if it is inventory," and gain
priority over the floating lien because of his status as a perfected purchase
money secured creditor. 9° In another scenario, P takes a purchase money
security interest before the goods arrive in the new jurisdiction and another
creditor, C, takes and perfects a security interest in the same goods. In either of
these situations, P's perfection will lapse if the goods fail to arrive in the new
jurisdiction within thirty days after the debtor received possession. 9 ' Unlike
sections 9-403(2) and 9-103(1)(d), however, section 9-103(1)(c) provides no
solution to the resulting priority dispute. Instead, resolution must await a
discussion of the policy issues underlying this area. 92
The difficulty of resolving lapse problems under section 9-103(1)(c) is
complicated not only by the lack of clarity in that provision, as noted above,
but also by the possible interaction of 9-103(1)(c) with section 9-103(1)(d). 93
Such interaction might occur in the following hypothetical. On January 2, S
U.C.C. $ 9-312(3).
U.C.C. SS" 9-312(3), 9-312(4).
°' This fact situation suggests two other issues of interest. The first involves the fact that
P will have filed in the new jurisdiction while S's or C's filing may be in the original jurisdiction.
If the goods were to arrive in the new jurisdiction two months after the debtor received possession
and rights in the collateral, and S or C filed at that time, P's filing would be the first in the new
jurisdiction even though his perfection had lapsed. Under section 9-312(5)(a), P might receive
priority. As Professor Kripke has noted elsewhere in discussing a similar problem, this would be
an unfortunate result. The better rule would be to carry over S's or C's earlier filing in the
original jurisdiction as the first continuously effective filing. See Kripke, The "Last Event" Test for
Perfection of Security Interest Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 47
(1975). It should be noted, particularly in cases involving a floating lienor, that a filing in a new
jurisdiction is likely since the debtor generally will have a place of business in the jurisdiction to
which the goods are headed.
The second issue arises because perfection under section 9-103(1)(d) lapses four months
after the goods are removed from the jurisdiction in which there is a filing. The problem is illus-
trated by the following fact situation: D buys goods in New York for use in California. D borrows
money from A and gives A a purchase money security interest in the goods. A properly files in
California under 9-103(1)(c). Later, while the goods are still in New York, D grants a non-
purchase money security interest in the goods to B and B properly files in New York. At this
point, under Professor Kripke's first effective filing rule, A probably has priority to the goods. If
the goods do not arrive in California within thirty days after the debtor receives possession, A's
perfection lapses and B may or may not be promoted. See text at note 84 supra. If, however, the
goods arrive in California two months after the debtor received possession, A's perfection prob-
ably dates only from the arrival of the goods in California. See U .0 . C. 9-303(2).,Unless A has
absolute priority under 9-103(1)(c), B will have priority. If B does not refile within four months
after the goods arrive in California, his perfection lapses and A, who is a purchaser under S
1-201(32), (33), regains priority.
92 See text at notes 240-45 infra.
93 See text at notes 60-62 supra.
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takes a purchase money security interest in a machine located in New York.
The parties understand that the machine is to be kept in Detroit. S files in
Michigan pursuant to section 9-103(1)(c). D takes possession of the machine in
New York on January 2 but the truck carrying the machine is late in leaving
New York and is delayed in Pennsylvania from January 20 until February 9.
On January 28, L levies on the machine in Pennsylvania. The debtor posts a
bond and the machine arrives in Detroit on February 10. Analogizing to sec-
tion 9-403(2), it would appear initially that although S had priority over L at
the time of levy, L would be promoted on February 1. The reason for L's
priority is that Michigan law ceased to govern perfection on that date, thereby
rendering S's Michigan filing ineffective. S might argue, however, that when
the goods arrived in Pennsylvania they were subject to a perfected Michigan
security interest. Accordingly, section 9-103(1)(d) would give him four months
to reperfect in Pennsylvania and absolute priority over lien creditors who arise
within the four months. Based on this section 9-103(1)(d) argument, the securi-
ty interest was perfected when L levied and remained perfected until May 20.
Thus S would retain priority. Similarly, when the goods arrived in Michigan
they were subject to a perfected Pennsylvania interest and it would appear that
since there was a Michigan filing, no further action would be required to
perfect the security interest. Nevertheless, this argument would fail because
section 9-103(1)(d) governs only if the collateral was "subject to a security in-
terest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from which the collateral was
removed." 94 Here the security interest was perfected under Michigan law but
the collateral was removed from New York. Thus, the four-month rule would
apparently not apply. S might argue that he perfected under New York law by
following New York's version of section 9-103(1)(c) but this seems to go beyond
the intent of the statute." The reasoning also would fail if the goods had been
levied upon in New York. In such a case, the goods were not "brought into and
kept in this state" so that the four-month rule again would not apply. It is in
such an unlikely situation that it would be necessary to resolve the question of
the effect of lapse on an intervening interest. This will be attempted in Part III
of this article. Thus, although it first seems that section 9-103(1)(d) would
resolve the priority dispute presented here, the above analysis indicates that it
is inapplicable. Consequently, as in the other situations outlined in this section
where lapses of perfection occur under the thirty-day rule of section 9-103
(1)(c), the decision as to who has priority remains uncertain.
c. Section 9-103(2)
Section 9-103(2), like the Code provisions discussed above, presents prob-
lems involving lapse of perfection. In section 9-103(3), however, unlike the sec-
tions previously noted, the focus is on goods covered by certificates of title. 96
94 U.C.C. S 9-103(1)(d) (emphasis added).
95 Comment 3 to 9-103 reveals that the drafters did not intend perfection to continue
beyond thirty days unless the goods reach their destination.
96 Certificates of title are a means of recording property interests in certain mobile
goods. All claims to the property should be ascertainable upon examination of the certificate. See
Vernon, supra note 67, at 348, 357.
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The 1972 Code drafters hoped that the certificate of title could "provide a sure
means of controlling property interests in goods like automobiles, which
because of their nature cannot readily be controlled by local or statewide filing
alone. " 97 Yet, the Code drafters recognized that the certificates were not suc-
cessful as control mechanisms for a variety of reasons. First, not all states have
uniform certificate of title legislation. 98 In some jurisdictions, notation of a
security interest on the certificate of title is not necessary in order to perfect a
security interest in a vehicle, while in others it is required." Further, it has
been possible, often through fraudulent means, to obtain clean certificates'°°
for vehicles subject to perfected security interests.'°'
The conflicts rules contained in section 9-103(2) concerning goods covered
by certificates of title have gone through some evolution. In the 1962 Code, the
problem arguably was covered by section 9-104(4). 102
 That section merely pro-
vided that if goods were covered by a certificate of title issued by a jurisdiction
that required notation on the certificate of a security interest in order to perfect
the interest, the law of that jurisdiction would govern perfection.'" Section
9-104(4) was not well thought out, perhaps because many states did not have
certificate of title legislation at the time it was drafted,'" and consequently the
provision presented several problems. First, it was unclear exactly when goods
were "covered" by a certificate of title.'" Second, once section 9-103(4)
became applicable to a particular case there was no indication of when it might
cease to govern.'" Thus, even if the car were reregistered in a new jurisdiction,
section 9-103(4) could continue to govern perfection requirements. This would
result in continued effectiveness of a certificate issued by a state other than the
one in which the car was registered. Third, even if section 9-103(4) were inter-
preted so that it ceased to govern after reregistration of the car or surrender of
the certificate, the 1962 version did not indicate what impact this would have
on competing parties whose claims arose while the certificate was effective.
Fourth, there was considerable confusion under the 1962 Code concerning
whether to apply 9-103(4) or 9-103(3). Some courts applied section 9-103(3)'s
U.C.C. 5 9-103, Comment 4(b).
96 Id.
99 Id.
100 A "clean certificate" is one on which no liens or security interests are recorded.
U.C.C. 5 9-103, Comment 4(b).
102 It should be noted that some cases that involved certificates of title and probably
should have been decided under section 9-103(4) were decided under section 9-103(3) instead.
See, e.g. , cases cited in note 107 infra.
105 U.C.C. 5 9-103(4) (1962 version).
104 As of 1962, the following states had no certificate systems: Alabama, Georgia, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
Island, Vermont. Vernon, supra note 67, at 348 n.6. Professor Gilmore has stated: "Subsection
(4) [of section 9-103] was a last minute addition to Article 9; it appears to have been imperfectly
thought through and is clearly defective in its drafting." GILMORE, supra note 36, at 328.
109 See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, 977 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS, 2d ed.].
'° Under section 9-103(4), the certificate could continue to govern long after the goods
left the issuing jurisdiction and after they were reregistered elsewhere. U.C.C. 5 9-103(4) (1962
version).
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four-month rule to cases in which the goods were moved from a noncertificate
to a certificate state even though the new state had issued a clean certificate
covering the goods.'" Use of section 9-103(3) in this situation, however, in-
creased the possibility that an innocent third party could be misled by his
reliance on the clean certificate since an unnoted interest could take priority.
Thus, the problems associated with section 9-103(4) in the 1962 Code led the
1972 drafters to revise the conflicts rules for goods covered by certificates of
title.
Under the 1972 Code, section 9-103(2), the provision dealing with goods
requiring certificates of title, states that the law of the jurisdiction issuing the
certificate governs as long as the certificate is outstanding and the vehicle is not
reregistered.'" Upon surrender of the certificate, the law of the issuing
jurisdiction ceases to govern.' 09 If the car is reregistered in another jurisdiction,
the certificate becomes ineffective four months after the car is removed from the
issuing jurisdiction or upon reregistration, whichever is later. Comment 4(c) to
section 9-103 states that during this period the secured party has the same pro-
tection as others have under section 9-103(1)(d). This statement, however, is
not supported by the statute. Rather, the rules of section 9-103(1)(d) apply only
if the security interest was "perfected in another jurisdiction otherwise than by
notation on a certificate of When the security interest is perfected by
notation, there is no rule in 9-103(2) similar to the rule of 9-103(1)(d), that pro-
motes purchasers upon lapse of the earlier security interest. Yet it can be
argued that the last sentence of 9-103(2) refers to 9-103(1)(d) because once a
four-month period expires and the vehicle is registered, it is no longer covered
by the certificate of title. Therefore, section 9-103(2) no longer applies and
unless the vehicle is considered mobile goods under section 9-103(3),"' section
9-103(1)(d) and its lapse rule could control. 12 Finally, if a clean certificate is
issued by the new jurisdiction, the security interest is subordinate to a non-
professional buyer who" 3 receives delivery after the certificate is issued, to the
extent that value is given without knowledge of the security interest.'"
107 See, e.g. , First Nat'! Bank of Bayshore v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162,
169 (1966); Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 A.D.2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570,
577-78 (4th Dep't 1962); WHITE & SUMMERS, 1st ed., supra note 67, at 857-58.
1 °8 U.C.C. S 9-103(2).
109 U.C.C. $ 9-103(2)(6).
U.C.C. S 9-103(2)(c).
"' Section 9-103(3)(a) provides:
goods which are mobile and which are of a type normally used in more than one
jurisdiction, such as motor vehicles, trailers, rolling stock, airplanes, shipping con-
tainers, road building and construction machinery and commercial harvesting
machinery and the like, if the goods are equipment or are inventory leased or held
for lease by the debtor to others, and are not covered by a certificate of title de-
,	 scribed in subsection (2).
Id. Perfection requirements and effects for mobile goods are governed by the law of the jurisdic-
tion where the debtor is located. U.C.C. $ 9-103(3)(b).
1 " See generally Coogan, supra note 67, at 548-49.
'" As used in this article, a non-professional buyer is one who is not in the business of
selling goods of the kind involved. See,	 U.C.C. S 9-103(2)(d).
"4 U.C.C. S 9-103(2)(d).
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Perfection of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title can
lapse, therefore, if the certificate is surrendered or if the vehicle is reregistered.
The effect of this lapse on parties whose interests arose prior to the lapse is only
partly clear. If the lapse involves reregistration and issuance of a clean cer-
tificate in a new jurisdiction, the security interest clearly will be subordinate to
the rights of a non-professional buyer even though it may be considered per-
fected under the four-month rule. Conversely, the security interest would be ef-
fective against a professional buyer and other purchasers and lienors during the
four-month period or until registration. Where the security interest is not re-
perfected before the end of the period, it may be appropriate, due to the
absence of any clear guidance in the statute, to look to section 9-103(1)(d) for
guidance concerning the rights of parties, other than non-professional buyers,
whose interests arose while the secured creditor was still perfected.
In summary, section 9-103(2) provides the conflicts rules for goods
covered by certificates of title. Yet like the provisions of the 1972 Code already
discussed, this section does not offer precise guidelines for resolving all priority
disputes. Thus, the status of certain parties after a lapse of perfection under
9-103(2) remains unclear.
3. Lapse of Perfection by Possession
A security interest in certain collateral"' may be perfected by the secured
party's taking possession of the collateral. E 6
 In general, the perfection is only
effective from the time possession is taken until the secured party surrenders
the collateral. " 7
 Thus, the secured creditor's perfection will lapse when posses-
sion of the collateral is surrendered. The 1972 Code drafters did not delineate
the consequences of the lapse of a possessory security interest. For instance,
section 9-305 does not indicate what should happen if a secured party sur-
renders possession and becomes unperfected after a purchaser or lien creditor
obtains an interest in the collateral. Section 9-403(2) also fails to address the
issue. Rather, it deals only with the effect of a lapse of perfection by filing.
As in the lapse situations already discussed, there are two methods of deal-
ing with the rights of parties whose interests predate the lapse. Their rights can
be considered as either frozen at the time they came into existence or promoted
over the possessory secured creditor once the creditor surrenders possession.
In a priority dispute between two secured creditors upon lapse of perfec-
tion by possession, section 9-312(5) may be helpful in deciding which method
to employ. For example, suppose S-1 takes a security interest in goods and
perfects by possession. Subsequently, S-2 takes a security interest in the same
goods and files a financing statement to perfect his security interest. S-1, as the
first to perfect, will have priority over S-2. If S-1 then surrenders possession of
the goods, his interest becomes unperfected. The issue now is whether S-1' s
security interest will continue to have priority over that of S-2, or whether S-2' s
' 15
 Perfection by possession is available for security interests in letters of credit, advices
of credit, goods, instruments, money, negotiable documents, chattel papers. U.C.C. 9-305.
ils U.C.C. 5 9-305.
" 7 Id.
266	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:247
interest will now be promoted. Under section 9-312(5), the general rule is that
the first to file or perfect, has priority. This rule applies, however, only if "there
is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection." Although
section 9-312(5) does not explicitly state the effect of a period in which there is
neither filing nor perfection, the implication is that the party having priority
would lose it once the filing or perfection lapses. Thus, in the dispute between
S-1 and S-2, a reading of section 9-312(5) indicates that once S-1 surrenders
possession, S-2's interest is promoted over that of S-1.
Resolving this lapse problem is more difficult if S-2 is a lien creditor in-
stead of a secured creditor. Such a situation could occur if the creditor levies
under a statute that does not require physical seizure of the goods. "a Section
9-301, which states the priority rules for disputes between lien creditors and
secured creditors, gives no indication of whether S-1's priority under this fact
pattern would be conditional or absolute. Further, it is impossible to tell how
purchasers other than secured creditors would fare in this situation. It might be
possible to apply section 9-312(5) by analogy to these other situations so as to
give the possessory secured creditor only conditional priority. Unfortunately,
there is no support in the case law or the legislative history of the Code for this
or any other approach to this lapse problem. Thus it is evident that the resolu-
tion of certain priority disputes following a lapse in perfection by possession
will create problems because of the lack of statutory or judicial guidance.
B. Temporary Automatic Perfection
1. Proceeds — Section 9-306(3)
A security interest in collateral continues in the proceeds of the collater-
al." 8
 If the original security interest was perfected, the interest in proceeds is
automatically perfected for ten days and thereafter if certain requisites are
met.I20 Under the 1962 Code, the security interest continued in proceeds if the
financing statement expressly covered proceeds.' 2 ' Where the financing state-
ment did not do so, the security interest in the proceeds could be perfected by a
new filing or possession before the end of the ten-day period.' 22 The 1972 revi-
sions eliminated the requirement that the financing statement cover proceeds.
As a result, a security interest in proceeds now is continuously perfected if a
financing statement covering the original collateral is filed and the proceeds are
"a See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE $S 488.340, 488.350, 488.360 (West Supp. 1978);
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW 5 6214(a).
"9 U.C.C. 5 9-306(2) provides:
"Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or
other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss or
damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to a per-
son other than a party to the security agreement. Money, checks, deposit ac-
counts, and the like are "cash proceeds". All other proceeds are "non-cash pro-
ceeds".
U.C.C. 5 9-306(1).
120 U.C.C. 5 9-306(3).
'" U.C.C. 5 9-306(3)(a) (1962 version).
129 U.C.C. 5 9-306(3)(b) (1962 version).
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a type of collateral in which a security interest could be perfected by a filing in
the same office.'" Additionally, if the proceeds are acquired with cash pro-
ceeds, the financing statement must describe the type of collateral that the
ultimate proceeds are.' 24
 Further, perfection will continue in the proceeds
where such proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds' 25
 and a financing state-
ment covers the original collateral. 126
 Finally, if the interest in proceeds meet
none of these criteria, it may be continuously perfected by a new filing or
possession during the ten-day period.'"
The nature of the ten-day period of automatic continuous perfection is not
spelled out in the Code. Assuming that the requisites for perfection beyond the
ten-day period are met, the secured creditor clearly will have priority over any
interests that arise during the ten-day period if the interests would normally be
subordinate to a perfected security interest.'" If the requisites for continued
perfection are not met, and perfection in proceeds lapses at the end of the ten-
day period, the effect of temporary perfection is unclear. As in the lapse situa-
tions already discussed, the rights of competing parties can be frozen as of the
time they arose, or the subordinate party can be promoted upon lapse of the
senior interest. In deciding who has priority here, one could analogize to sec-
tion 9-403(2) and adopt what appears to be a Code policy of promoting former-
ly subordinate interests over lapsed senior secured creditors. This would make
the ten-day period of automatic perfection a grace period, 129
 since the secured
creditor would be considered perfected during the ten-day period only if he
takes the required action prior to the end of the period. It could be argued,
however, that subordinate interests arising during the ten-day period should
remain subordinate even if the action required to extend perfection beyond the
ten days is not taken. The ten-day perfection would lose much of its vitality if
upon lapse at the end of the ten-day period the perfection was no longer effec-
tive against purchasers or lien creditors who arose during the period.
Since most security interests in proceeds are perfected automatically even
beyond the ten-day period without any action on the part of the secured
creditor, it is not surprising that there has been no flood of litigation concerning
the nature of the ten-day period of automatic perfection. Nevertheless, the
question of the effect of lapse at the end of ten days has arisen in at least two
cases. In Security Savings Bank of Marshalltown, Iowa v. United States,'" the court
held that the ten-day period did not provide absolute protection. In that case,
the plaintiff bank loaned money to a debtor and took a purchase money securi-
ty interest in a truck that the debtor bought. Subsequently, the debtor traded
' 23 U.C.C. $ 9-306(3)(a).
124 Id.
'" Identifiable cash proceeds are cash proceeds that can be traced to the original col-
lateral. See, e.g., Universal CIT Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317,
324 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
126 U.C.C. 5 9-306(3)(b).
127 U.C.C. 5 9-306(3)(c).
128
 In conflicts between competing secured creditors, the date of filing as to the original
collateral is considered the date of filing as to the proceeds. U.C.C. 5 9-312(b).
129 See text at notes 158-61 infra.
10 22 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1260 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
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this truck for another truck. He received title to the latter on June 30, 1975. On
July 7, 1975, the government seized this truck for delinquent taxes."' On July
28, 1975, the bank's security interest was noted on the new truck's certificate of
title. The federal district court found that the government obtained its interest
in the truck during the ten-day period of continuous perfection provided by sec-
tion 9-306(3). 132
 The plaintiff bank's perfection lapsed three days later and it
did not reperfect until almost a month after the lapse. The government argued
that its lack of priority as a lien creditor could change at the end of the ten-day
period so that it could be promoted upon the lapse of perfection of the bank's
senior interest.'" Agreeing with the government, the court viewed the ten-day
period of continuous perfection as a grace period.'" Consequently, it held that
where the plaintiff failed to reperfect before the period expired, its perfection
lapsed, the lapse related back to July 1, and the government was promoted to a
first priority creditor. ' 35 In support of its holding that the government was pro-
moted in priority at the end of the ten-day period, the court also analogized to
section 9-403(2), 136
 which promotes purchasers and lien creditors upon a lapse
in perfection of a senior security interest.'"
The earlier decision of Blair Milling & Elevator Co. v. Wehrkamp' 38 held that
the ten-day period was one of absolute protection to the secured creditor. In
that case, the debtor in a secured transaction was unable to make his payments
and the collateral was sold pursuant to an agreement between the parties. Im-
mediately thereafter, another creditor levied on the proceeds of the sale. Since
the secured creditor's financing statement did not cover proceeds,'" its perfec-
tion in the proceeds lapsed ten days after the sale. In determining the respective
rights of the secured creditor and the lien creditor, the court noted that section
9-306 offers no guidance concerning the priority of interests that arise during
the ten-day period if perfection lapses at the end of the period. The Blair court
thus looked to pre-Code law which granted a secured creditor absolute priority
over a lien creditor whose rights arose prior to the lapse of perfection of a
security interest. Using this approach to resolve the section 9-306 ambiguity,
the court concluded that the secured creditor had a superior interest in the pro-
ceeds.
Although case law provides no uniform answer to the issue of priority
under section 9-306(3), an interpretation of that provision according to its plain
meaning indicates that the ten-day period of automatic perfection accords a
secured creditor absolute priority over a junior claimant whose interest arose
during the ten-day period. If the Code drafters had intended otherwise — that
the secured creditor would be perfected as to proceeds during the ten-day
"' The seizure was pursuant to 26 U.S.C. SS 6331-6344 (1976).
12 22 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 1262.
133 Id.
"4 Id. at 1264.
135 The court incorrectly referred to the Bank as unsecured at the end of ten days. In
fact, the proceeds interest would continue beyond the ten-day period, but as an unperfected
security interest. U.C.C. S 9-306.
1S6 See text at notes 20-57 supra.
"7 22 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1265.
18 16 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1421 (Kan. 1975).
"9 The 1962 version of the Code was in effect in Kansas at that time.
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period only if he filed before the end of that period — they could have said so.
Yet they did not. Rather, the wording'" of the section suggests that regardless
of what happens after the ten-day period, the secured creditor is protected at
least during that period. Moreover, analogizing to section 9-403(2), as the
court in Security Savings Bank did, 14 ' does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the ten-day period provides something less than absolute perfection. In
section 9-403(2), the drafters expressly provided for conditional perfection. If
they intended conditional perfection in section 9-306(3), they could have ex-
pressly provided for it there too. Section 9-103(1)(d) also illustrates the drafters'
tendency to provide expressly for conditional priority. In that section, which
provides a four-month period to reperfect that is analogous to a period of tem-
porary automatic perfection, explicit language was used to grant only condi-
tional priority over purchasers. The omission of lien creditors from that section
arguably implies absolute priority over them. Similarly, the omission of any
conditional priority rule in section 9-306(3) may also imply a grant of absolute
priority.
In conclusion, the effect of a lapse of perfection on the purchasers and lien
creditors whose interests arise during the ten-day period is not expressly stated
in section 9-306(3). Moreover, the two cases to have considered the issue offer
no definitive resolution of the problem since each reached a different result. An
analysis of Code provisions other than section 9-306(3), however, gives support
to the view that the drafters intended the creditor whose perfection has lapsed
to achieve absolute priority over another party, whose interest was created dur-
ing the ten-day period.
2. Certain Instruments, Negotiable Documents, Goods — Section 9-304
Sections 9-304(4) and (5), like section 9-306(3), provide for a period of
temporary automatic perfection. In section 9-304(4), a twenty-one-day period
of perfection is granted for a security interest in instruments to the extent it is
given for new value under a written agreement."' According to section
9-304(5), the same perfection period also applies to security interests in instru-
ments, negotiable documents, and goods held by a bailee that are not covered
by a negotiable document. Section 9-304(5) is utilized when a secured party
with a perfected security interest makes the instrument, document, or goods
available to the debtor for certain limited purposes.'" These two provisions of
I" The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest if the
interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a perfected security interest and
becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless [exceptions not
applicable] . . ." U.C.C. 5 9-306(3).
141 See note 137 supra.
142 "A security interest in instruments (other than certificated securities) or negotiable
documents is perfected without filing or the taking of possession for a period of 21 days from the
time it attaches to the extent that it arises for new value given under a written security
agreement." U.C.C. § 9-304(4).
143 U.C.C. Section 9-304{5) provides:
A security interest remains perfected for a period of 21 days without filing where a
secured party having a perfected security interest in an instrument (other than a
certificated security), a negotiable document or goods in possession of a bailee
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9-304, derived from sections 3 and 8 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 144
 are
intended to permit certain short-term transactions without necessitating a filing
and consequent cluttering of the files, or without forcing a break in a secured
creditor's perfection. 145
 The twenty-one-day limit on this temporary perfection
was intended to conform with the limit in section 60(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy
Act. 146
Under 9-304, as under 9-306(3), there is a question concerning the actual
effect of this period of temporary perfection. Suppose, for example, that Bank
takes a security interest in a negotiable document of title covering 1,000
bushels of wheat. There is a written security agreement and Bank gives new
value. Bank neither files nor takes possession of the document. Ten days after
the security interest attaches and is perfected under 9-304(4), lien creditor, L,
levies on the document. Neither party takes any further action until a month
later when Bank seeks to obtain the document from the sheriff, who is holding
it pursuant to the levy. At the time L levied, the document clearly was subject
to Bank's perfected security interest"' and L was subordinate to Bank.'" Yet
twenty-one days after the security interest attached, Bank's perfection lapsed.
In this situation, does Bank have absolute priority over L or does Bank lose its
priority once its perfection lapses? As a preliminary matter, if L had been a
purchaser to whom the document had been duly negotiated, 149
 L would have
priority over Bank notwithstanding Bank's perfection.' 5° Since L is a lien
creditor, however, the document could not be duly negotiated to him.
Neither the Code nor the comments indicate whether absolute or condi-
other than one who has issued a negotiable document therefor
(a) makes available to the debtor the goods or documents representing the
goods for the purpose of ultimate sale or exchange or for the purpose of load-
ing, unloading, storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing, process-
ing or otherwise dealing with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or
exchange, but priority between conflicting security interests in the goods is
subject to subsection (3) of Section 9-312; or
(b) delivers the instrument to the debtor for the purpose of ultimate sale or ex-
change or of presentation, collection, renewal or registration of transfer.
U.C.C. S 9-304(5).
144 Uniform Trust Receipts Act 55 3, 8 .
145 See, e.g. ,U .C.C. 9-304, Comment 4; WHITE & SUMMERS, 2d ed., supra note 105,
at 928-33.
146 U.C.C. $ 9-304, Comment 4; GiLMORE, supra note 36, at 456. Cf. Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 5 547(e)(2) (ten-day limit).
147 U.C.C. 5 9-304(4).
1 " U.C.C. §5 9-201 (general validity of security agreement against creditors), 9-301
(1)(b) (by implication, lien creditor is subordinate to prior perfect secured parties).
19 U.C.C. 5 7-501(4) provides:
A negotiable document of title is "duly negotiated" when it is negotiated in the
manner stated in this section to a holder who purchases it in good faith without
notice of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person and for value,
unless it is established that the negotiation is not in the regular course of business




 U.C.C. 5 9-309. See also U.C.C.
  5 7-503(1).
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tional priority was intended in such a fact pattern. Comment V" does state
that section 9-304 is derived from the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA),
and a study of the analogous sections in the Act sheds some light on the issue.
Section 8 of the UTRA validated a security interest in goods, documents or in-
struments against "all creditors" for thirty days. 152 It also stated that "[slave
as provided in Subsection 1, the entruster's security interest shall be void as
against lien creditors who become such after such thirty-day period and
without notice of such interest and before filing."'" The negative implication
of this provision was that the entruster retained priority even beyond the thirty-
day period over a lien creditor whose interest arose during the period. Professor
Gilmore notes that luinder UTRA § 8 the entruster is protected for 30 days
against 'all creditors' (which includes lien creditors) without any requirement that
he file within that period or ever." 154 This interpretation of section 8 makes sense
since the thirty-day period was designed to relieve the entruster of the burden
of filing in short-term transactions.'" Absolute priority assured the entruster
that he was protected against any interests that arose during the thirty-day
period. 156 Of course the entruster, relying on the thirty-day period, undoubted-
ly envisioned a transaction that would be completed with the loan paid or the
collateral liquidated within thirty days. In such cases, the question of an in-
tervening claimant's rights after the thirty-day period would be insignificant.
There are certain situations, however, where the security interest must survive
thirty days, and then the effect of the temporary perfection becomes important.
For example, an intervening lien creditor could prevent completion of the
transaction within thirty days by inducing the sheriff to take and retain posses-
sion of the collateral. In addition, the debtor's bankruptcy could occur during
the thirty-day period. Finally, there could be a dispute over proceeds. In any of
these situations, the entruster's rights will depend on whether the temporary
perfection provides absolute or conditional priority. Thus, if the analogy of the
UTRA is accepted, the priority accorded a secured creditor who takes advan-
tage of the temporary automatic perfection under 9-304(4) would be absolute.
Nevertheless, since both the UTRA provision and section 9-304(4) were meant
to cover only short-term transactions, there may be no need for absolute priori-
ty. As a result, any transaction that stretches beyond the twenty-one-day
period could leave a secured creditor at his peril unless he otherwise perfects.
U.C.C. 5 9-304, Comment 4.
'" Uniform Trust Receipts Act 5 8(1).
'" Uniform Trust Receipts Act 5 8(2).
"4 GILMORE, supra note 36, at 494 (emphasis added). Professor Gilmore cites two cases
which seem to indicate that the priority received by an entruster during the 30-day period is ab-
solute. In Industries Sales Corp. v. Reliance Mfg. Co., 243 Miss. 463, 138 So. 2d 484 (1962),
the court granted the entruster priority over a lien creditor whose interest arose during the 30-day
period even though the entruster failed to file before the end of the period. In In re McManus
Motors, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1939), the court held that payments made to an en-
truster during the 30-day period were not preferential even though the entruster never filed. This
implies that the court believed that the entruster would have had priority over a lien creditor
whose interest arose during the 30-day period. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 5 60(a)(2), 11 U.S.C.
5 96(a)(2) (1976).
153 GILMORE, supra note 36, at 493-94.
156 Id.
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As under 9-304(4), the question of absolute versus conditional priority can
be important under 9-304(5). The latter section permits a secured creditor with
a possessory or possessory-type interest to maintain his perfection under cer-
tain circumstances for twenty-one days notwithstanding his surrender of
possession.'" In most instances, the collateral will be sold, processed, or other-
wise liquidated during the twenty-one-day period. Nevertheless, if this does
not occur the question of conditional versus absolute priority is presented when
a competing interest arises during the period and the secured creditor's perfec-
tion lapses. Arguably, a secured creditor who temporarily releases collateral to
a debtor has an obligation to police that collateral, and to retake it if it has not
been liquidated within the period. Further, if the secured creditor fails to police
or retake the collateral, it is not unreasonable to subordinate him even to in-
terests that arose during the period of temporary perfection. Alternatively, the
temporary perfection becomes considerably less meaningful if it is only effec-
tive in the absence of a lapse. Unfortunately, as with section 9-304(4) and the
other Code provisions already presented, section 9-304(5) fails to specify
whether the secured party, upon a lapse in perfection, is granted conditional or
absolute priority over a third party whose interest arose before the lapse.
C. Grace Periods — Sections 9-301(2) and 9-312(4)
In sharp contrast to temporary automatic perfection, sections 9-301(2)
and 9-312(4) establish grace periods for reperfection. Under section 9-301(2), a
purchase money secured party will take prior to a bulk transferee or a lien
creditor whose interest arises between the time of the security interest attaches
and the time of filing if a financing statement is filed within ten days after the
debtor receives possession of the collateral.'" Under this section, the rights of
competing intervening claimants are clear. If the secured creditor fails to file
before the end of the ten-day period, he is treated as having never had a
perfected security interest and, therefore, is subordinate to a lien creditor or
bulk transferee whose rights arose during the ten-day period. There is no ab-
solute priority since the secured creditor is not deemed to have been perfected
during this period. If he files within ten days, the secured creditor is treated as
if he had perfected on the date the security interest attached as against the lien
creditor or bulk transferee, and he receives priority over such parties even
though he had not filed until after their interests arose.'"
A similar grace period is provided by section 9-312(4).' 5° It gives a pur-
'" See text of U.C.C. $ 9-304(5) at note 143 supra.
l" U.C.C. 9-301(2) states:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest before
or within ten days after the debtor received possession of the collateral, he takes
priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise be-
tween the time the security interest attached and the time of filing.
U.
159 Id.
'" U.C.C. $ 9-212(4) provides:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the pur-
January 1981]
	 LAPSE OF PERFECTION
	 273
chase money secured creditor in noninventory collateral ten days after the
debtor receives possession of the collateral to perfect his security interest and
receive priority over otherwise prior security interests. Once again, the rights
of competing claimants are plain. If the purchase money secured creditor
perfects within ten days, he receives priority. If he waits more than ten days, he
loses to any prior perfected secured creditors, including those who may have
perfected during the ten-day period.
It is evident from the wording of sections 9-301(2) and 9-312(4) that when
the drafters intended to provide a grace period, they did so expressly. They
employed the concept of a grace period when there was no prior perfection to
be continued. The grace period permits an unperfected secured creditor to take
priority over a competing claimant to whom he would normally lose as long as
he perfects within a specified time. According to Professor Gilmore, the grace
period provided for purchase money security interests is merely a recognition
"of the factual . . . impossibility of advance filing in many typical purchase-
money transactions, particularly those arising out of sales of consumer goods
and commercial equipment.t n Isi
The grace period does not present a true lapse problem. If a secured
creditor acting within a grace period perfects in the requisite time, he receives
the benefit of the grace period and of continuous perfection. If he fails to perfect
in time, he simply loses the protection afforded by the grace period. Since there
will have been no perfection during the grace period, there is no perfection to
lapse. Nevertheless, the grace period is relevant to a discussion of lapse because
it is the opposite of temporary automatic perfection. The grace period begins
with the absence of perfection and permits eventual perfection to relate back.
Temporary automatic perfection begins with perfection and permits subse-
quent acts to continue that perfection with no break in continuity.
If the purpose of giving a period of time within which a secured party can
perfect is to provide certain rights for him during that period, regardless of his
future actions, temporary automatic perfection is appropriate, and the secured
party's rights should be absolute during the period. If the purpose is merely to
permit a filing to relate back to an earlier date, then the grace period is the
proper approach. It limits the rights of perfection to those creditors who act
within the period. Those who fail to act within the allowed time lose the benefit
of the relation back.
II. ISSUES UNDERLYING THE PROBLEM
Three issues underlie the Code's treatment of lapse of perfection, tem-
porary automatic perfection, and grace periods: (I) the effect of a trustee in
bankruptcy's status as a lien creditor, (2) preference problems, and (3) circular
priority problems. While these issues were considered important by the Code
chase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession
of the collateral or within ten days thereafter.
Id.
161 GILMORE, supra note 36, at 498.
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drafters, there is no indication that a comprehensive evaluation of these issues
preceded the drafting of the sections involved. An attempt at such an analysis
follows.
A. Trustee as a Lien Creditor
Under both the old Bankruptcy Act and the new Bankruptcy Reform Act
(Bankruptcy Code), the trustee has the status of a creditor who acquired a
judicial lien on the date of bankruptcy. 162 According to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, a perfected secured creditor takes priority over a subsequent judicial
lien creditor while an unperfected secured creditor is subordinate to a lien
creditor. 163 Thus, the trustee, as a lien creditor, can defeat any security interest
that is unperfected on the date of bankruptcy. If a security interest is perfected
on the date of commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding, however, and for
some reason the perfection lapses while the estate is still open, a troublesome
issue is presented. In this situation, the question is whether the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, as a lien creditor, might defeat the lapsed security interest even though
it was perfected on the date of bankruptcy.
Prior to the 1972 revisions of article 9, it was unclear whether a trustee in
bankruptcy could defeat such a security interest. Commentators thought the
respective rights of claimants were frozen on the date of bankruptcy so that
subsequent lapse would not affect the status of a secured creditor perfected at
bankruptcy. 164 This view received support from a pre-Code decision, Lockhart
v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co. , 165 in which the court held that the rights of a
mortgagee vis-a-vis a trustee in bankruptcy are fixed as of the date of bank-
ruptcy. 166 In that case, a refiling of the mortgage which was required by state
law167 was not required after the debtor had filed a bankruptcy petition.'"
Other courts, however, have differed in resolving this matter. Some courts
have held that a mortgagee's failure to refile as required by state law after the
date of bankruptcy permits the trustee to avoid the creditor's lien.'" Two
relatively recent cases disclosed doubts about whether a secured creditor's
162 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 5 70(c), 11 U.S.C. 5 110(c) (1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, 5 544(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. 5 544(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
163 U.C.C. 55 9-201, 9-301(1)(6).
164 See 4A W. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5 70.81(6) (1978); Kripke, Mr. Levenberg's
Criticism of the Final Report of the Article 9 Review Committee: A Reply, 56 MINN. L. REV. 805, 811-12
(1972); Levenberg, Comments on Certain Proposed Amendments to Article .9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 56 MINN. L. REV. 117, 125-26 (1971).
165 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940).
166 Id. at 661-62.
167 N.Y. LIEN LAW 5 235 (McKinney 1966).
166 Accord, In re Delia Brothers, 29 U.C.C. REP, SERV. 1446 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re
South County Motel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 252 (D.R.I. 1976). See also In re Lake County Fuel &
Supply Co., 70 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 577 (1935). Cf. Grana v. Mehs,
152 Misc. 828, 274 N.Y.S. 341 (1934) (chattel mortgagee has priority over judgment creditor
who purchased chattel before lapse of mortgagee's filing even though filing subsequently lapsed).
169 See, e.g., In re Lukas, 24 F.2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1928); Benedict v. Zutes, 88 Misc.
214, 150 N.Y.S. 147 (1914).
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rights under the Code are frozen as of the date of bankruptcy if perfection
subsequently lapses.'"
The 1972 Code helped resolve the lapse problem with respect to a trustee
in bankruptcy. Section 9-403(2) contains language indicating that upon lapse
of perfection, a lien creditor is promoted over the lapsed interest."' Then, to
ensure that this would not be interpreted to benefit a trustee in bankruptcy
asserting lien creditor status, the revised section 9-403(2) also provides that a
security interest perfected by filing on the date of initiation of insolvency pro-
ceedings remains perfected until after the proceedings are terminated.'" The
trustee's status as a lien creditor is not, therefore, a basis for avoiding a security
interest perfected by filing even though the effectiveness of the filing may lapse
after a bankruptcy petition is filed. This will obtain, however, only if section
9-403(2) applies to bankruptcy. Arguably, a provision that dispenses with the
need to refile in the event of insolvency proceedings but requires refiling in all
other circumstances conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code. Since the Bankruptcy
Code envisions the trustee as a lien creditor with all of the rights accorded a lien
creditor by state law, a state law that discriminates against the trustee in par-
ticular may fall in the face of the federal statute under the Supremacy
Clause. 13
 Nonetheless, since section 9-403(2) is not limited to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings or to trustee-lien creditors and since it does not affect the rights of
creditors but merely dispenses with a ministerial act, it is probably valid. Cer-
tainly no case to date has held otherwise.
One could argue more convincingly for freezing the respective priorities as
of the date of bankruptcy if the automatic stay14
 would prevent a creditor from
filing a timely continuation statement. The automatic stay enjoins most acts to
collect debts and most acts to "create, perfect, or enforce liens. "175 If the filing
of a continuation statement were not permitted and the secured creditor's
rights were not frozen as of the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding,
all security interests could eventually be invalidated merely by delaying the
close of the bankruptcy case. This obviously would be an absurd result. Under
the Bankruptcy Act 16
 and the Rules,'" the automatic stay did not prevent the
'" Eastern Indiana Production Credit Ass'n v. Farmers State Bank, 31 Ohio App. 2d
252, 254-55 (1972). The dispute in that case was between two secured creditors who both claimed
certain property that had been abandoned by the trustee. Although the case can be read as only
applying to abandoned property, the court's discussion seems to cover even property claimed by
the trustee. See also In re Sheets, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 893 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Okla. 1970). Con-
tra, In re Delia Brothers, 29 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1446 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re South County
Motel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 252 (D.R.I. 1976). Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 24 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 794 (E.D. Va. 1978) (filing suit tolled any obligation of plaintiff to defendant to file
continuation statement upon expiration of financing statement since defendant had notice of
security interest).
" 1 See text at notes 52-55 supra.
12 U.C.C. 9-403(2).
13 U.S. CONST, art. 6, cl. 2.
1 " Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 5 362, 11 U.S.C. 362 (Supp. II 1978).
175 Id.
16
 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, $ II, 11 U.S.C. 5 29 (1976).
'" Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 55 401, 601.
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filing of a continuation statement or, if necessary, a new financing statement.
There is some question under the Bankruptcy Code, however, as to whether
the automatic stay applies to a post-petition filing. Section 362(a)(4) provides
that "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate" is stayed.'" Arguably the filing of a continuation statement or of a new
financing statement is not an "act to create, perfect, or enforce" a security in-
terest, but rather merely continues the perfection. In addition, section 362(b)(3)
excepts from the stay any act to perfect an interest if the trustee would be sub-
ject to the perfection under section 546(b). Section 546(b) makes the trustee
"subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of an interest
in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property
before the date of such perfection." If filing a continuation statement to pre-
vent a lapse comes within the terms of section 546(b), then such a filing would
be exempted from the automatic stay, and conceivably could be required in
order to retain rights against the trustee notwithstanding section 9-403(2). It
appears that Congress was concerned in section 546(b) mainly with certain
grace periods that are accorded to secured creditors.'" For example, a pur-
chase money secured creditor has ten days after the debtor receives possession
of the collateral to file. By filing, the secured creditor obtains priority over a
lien creditor whose interest arose after the security interest attached but before
the filing. Section 546(b) recognizes this grace period as valid against the
bankruptcy trustee. The provision probably is not intended to permit filing of a
continuation statement. Assuming section 9-403(2) is valid, or taking the more
traditional view that all rights are frozen as of the date of the petition, no filing
should be necessary and, therefore, the stay can apply, to the filing of continua-
tion statements. If section 546(b) is interpreted to apply to, and, therefore, per-
mit the filing of, a continuation statement, it may by implication require such a
filing to retain rights against the trustee. Section 546(b) would thereby create
the grounds for invalidating section 9-403(2).
The section 9-403(2) argument that perfection continues if insolvency pro-
ceedings intervene is not available in other lapse situations. Under section
9-103(1)(d), the issue of a perfection lapse in insolvency proceedings is not like-
ly to be a problem since a creditor who obtains a lien during the four months
after goods are moved to another jurisdiction probably is not promoted over a
secured creditor who fails to refile before the end of the period.' 80 Therefore the
trustee in bankruptcy would receive no benefit even if perfection lapsed under
section 9-103(1)(d). In other situations, however, such as sections 9-103(1)(c)
or 9-306(3), it is possible that a lien creditor is promoted upon lapse.'" If the
perfection existing on the date of bankruptcy lapses, and the acts required to
continue perfection are not taken, promotion of lien creditors would permit the
trustee to assert priority over the secured creditor. This would be unfortunate
because creditors may be lulled by the existence of a bankruptcy proceeding in-
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, S 362(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. S 362(a)(4) (Supp. II 1978).
179 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1977).
18° See text at notes 75-79 supra.
181 See text at notes 88 & 130-37 supra.
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to a failure to refile or may be enjoined from filing by section 362(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. It is difficult to discern the drafters' intent regarding the
possibility of the trustee achieving priority upon a lapse of perfection. Since the
drafters specifically confronted this issue in section 9-403(2), they may have in-
tended a different approach in the sections in which they were silent on the
matter. Yet it seems more likely that the drafters simply overlooked this issue,
along with the entire issue of lapse in most of these sections. In this event, there
may have been no intent to promote trustees in bankruptcy or any lien
creditors upon lapse in sections such as 9-103(1)(c) and 9-306(3). Alternatively,
even if lien creditors are to be promoted, the rights of the bankruptcy trustee as
a lien creditor may differ from other lien creditors because they may be frozen
on the date of bankruptcy. While the matter may be the most reasonable ap-
proach, there is little support in the wording of the Bankruptcy Act or the
Bankruptcy Code for discriminating against the trustee as a lien creditor." 2
Nevertheless, there is some support for freezing rights as of the date of bank-
ruptcy's' and that would be the most appropriate resolution.
A similar issue regarding the priority of the trustee in bankruptcy arises
when a secured creditor has a possessory security interest at the commence-
ment of bankruptcy proceedings. According to section 542 of the Bankruptcy
Code,'" the creditor may be required to turn over the property to the trustee
under certain circumstances. If the creditor were deemed to be unperfected
once the property was turned over, and if a lien creditor — the trustee — were
promoted over the possessory secured creditor upon lapse, the trustee could
avoid virtually all possessory security interests. This would be a ridiculous
result and apart from the dictates of the Uniform Commercial Code, it would
seem to be proscribed by the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court is a
court of equity and would not be party to such an inequitable transaction.
In summary, the effect of a lapsed security interest on a trustee in bank-
ruptcy depends upon the statutory provision governing perfection. Under sec-
tion 9-403(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, the interest of a trustee, as lien
creditor, is subordinate to a lapsed security interest, perfected at the date of
bankruptcy. Under Code sections 9-103(1)(c) and 9-306(3), however, it is con-
ceivable that the interest of a trustee in bankruptcy, considered a lien creditor,
is promoted upon lapse. Finally, where a secured creditor has a possessory
security interest at the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, but later is re-
quired to turn the property over to the trustee, the secured creditor's interest
will remain perfected. Thus, in this situation, the trustee's interest will remain
subordinate to that of the secured creditor.
182 In one sense, there is no discrimination against the trustee. That is, if rights are to be
frozen as of the date of bankruptcy, they presumably would be frozen for all creditors. See
U.C.C. S 9-403(2) (" security interest remains perfected until termination of the insolvency pro-
ceedings" (emphasis added)). There is a problem, however, since perfection continues without
further action by the secured party beyond the time when it normally would lapse only when
there is an insolvency proceeding. Thus the secured creditor receives an advantage in insolvency
proceedings that is not available in the absence of such proceedings.
183 See notes 165 & 168 supra.
"4 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 5 542, 11 U.S.C. S 542 (Supp. II 1978).
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B. Preference Problems
In addition to the problem of determining the status of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy's interest, there is a second factor pervading the lapse of perfection area.
It is the desire to avoid a finding that a reperfection might constitute a
preference under the Bankruptcy Code. A preference is a transfer of the debt-
ors' property, to or for the benefit of a creditor, on account of an antecedent
debt. The transfer must have been made while the debtor was insolvent and
within ninety days of bankruptcy. Further, it must enable the creditor to
receive a greater percentage of his debt than he would have received in a liq-
uidation without the transfer. 185 A transfer is deemed to be made at the time it
takes effect if it is perfected within ten days, at the time of perfection if it is not
perfected within ten days, or immediately before bankruptcy if it is never
perfected.' 88 The transfer is considered perfected "when a creditor on a simple
contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the
transferee." ' 87
It is the lien creditor test for perfection that creates a potential preference
problem in lapse situations. Justice Braucher described this problem in terms
of the four-month rule of section 9-103(1)(d). 188 Initially, he observed that
under 9-103(1)(d), a security interest in goods moved to another jurisdiction, if
not refiled within four months, is considered unperfected against one who pur-
chases after removal.' 89 Yet a security interest in the same goods is deemed ab-
solutely perfected against a lien creditor levying during this four-month
period.'" He explained this contrast in priority between a purchaser and lien
creditor by referring to the drafters' concern that conditional priority over a
lien creditor would not adequately protect the secured party against the lien
"5 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 547(6), 11 U.S.C. 5 547(b) (Supp. II 1978). If the
creditor is an insider and had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent on the
date of the transfer the 90-day preference period is increased to a year. Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. 5 96 (1976), was substantially the same as 5 547 of the new
Code. The preference period was four months instead of 90 days, the greater percentage require-
ment was worded as needing a creditor to receive a "greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class," and the trustee needed to show that the creditor had reasonable
cause to believe the debtor was insolvent on the date of the transfer in order to avoid it.
186 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 5 547(e)(2), 11 U.S.C. 547(e)(2) (1978). Under
the old Bankruptcy Act, if the transfer was for new and contemporaneous consideration, there
was a grace period in which the interest could be perfected. This grace period extended for 21
days or, if the state provided a grace period, for the length of the state grace period, whichever
was shorter. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 5 60 (a)(7), 11 U.S.C. 5 96(a)(7) (1976). It has been argued
that the Uniform Commercial Code, rather than not providing a grace period (which would
under section 60(a)(7) give a secured creditor 21 days to perfect), grants a grace period of zero
days, and that therefore any delay in perfection could be preferential. See, e.g. , GILMORE, supra
note 36, at 1327-29.
1 " Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 547(e)(1)(b), 11 U.S.C. 547(e)(1)(b) (Supp. II
1978). See also Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 5 60(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. 96(a)(2) (1976); U.C.C. S
9-301(b).
1813 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 255-61 (1971).
'" Id. at 255.
190 U.C.C. S 9-301(1)(d).
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creditor until the secured party filed in the new jurisdiction. 191 Justice Braucher
shared the drafters' concern because he theorized that unless the filing was
made immediately upon the arrival of the goods, the transfer, being deemed
made when the filing occurs, would be on account of an antecedent debt and
would satisfy the other elements of a preference. If filing occurred immediately
upon the goods' arrival, there would be no break in the perfection from the
original jurisdiction and therefore there would be no new transfer. Justice
Braucher maintained that by making the four-month period of temporary
perfection one of absolute priority, the drafters ensured continuous perfection
as long as the secured creditor refiled during the period,'" and thus avoidance
of a preference problem.
Braucher's suggestion that conditional priority would constitute a
preference is questionable. The purpose of the preference section of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is to foster an equitable distribution of a debtor's assets 193
 and to
prevent the enforcement of secret liens on the debtor's property.'" The four-
month period of temporary perfection in section 9-103(1)(d) hinders neither of
these goals, even if the perfection is merely conditional. Admittedly there is a
period of time during which a secured creditor can have a consensual lien with-
out having a filing in the state where a filing would be expected. The creditor,
however, will have perfected in the original jurisdiction and therefore is not
purposely keeping the lien secret. In addition, a thorough investigation of the
collateral's history by any interested third party most likely would lead to a
discovery of the original filing. Moreover, the short period of perfection
without filing within the jurisdiction was provided because it would take even a
good faith secured creditor some time to learn that the goods have been moved
and to refile in the new jurisdiction.' 95 It is unrealistic to assume that secured
creditors can learn of the removal and file before or at the very moment that the
goods are removed. Any such requirement obviously would make secured
creditors very insecure. Certainly Congress did not intend to require such a
result nor did it desire absolute rather than conditional perfection as a condi-
tion for the effectiveness of the four-month period. The lien creditor language
of the preference provision, section 547, was added to the bankruptcy law for
reasons totally unrelated to problems of temporary perfection.' 96
Although the lien creditor language should not be applied to the problem
of temporary perfection, the Code drafters, obviously aware of other strained
and inappropriate interpretations of the Bankruptcy Act,' 97 elected to take no
chances. Accordingly, section 9-103(1)(d) takes no position on the status of in-
1 " 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 259-60 (1971).
192 Id.
193 H.R. 8200, H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977).
194 Freedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After Acquired Property Clauses under the
Code, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 194, 202 (1959).
U.C.C. S 9-103, Comment 7.
196
 See, e.g., W. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5 60.38 (14th ed. 1977).
' 97 See, e.g., Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1955); Constance v. Harvey, 215
F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
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tervening lien creditors, with the implication that it provides absolute protec-
tion against lien creditors during the four-month period. This permits a court
to interpret the section equitably without running afoul of the preference sec-
tion. In contrast to section 9-103(1)(d), however, the drafters clearly provided
only conditional priority to the secured creditor under section 9-403(2), the
general lapse provision of the Code. While Justice Braucher was concerned
that conditional priority under 9-103(1)(d) would result in a preference, he
defended the grant of conditional priority' 98 in 9-403(2) on two grounds. First,
he noted that most property or transactions involved would not last five years
so that lapse could not occur. 199 Second, he assumed that the preference section
of the Bankruptcy Code would not apply to a five-year filing period as it might
to a four-month period of temporary perfection."° Neither defense survives
careful scrutiny. First, for purposes of determining whether a transfer is a
preference, the question whether the property or transaction is to last five years
is irrelevant. If the property or transaction could last five years, so that a filing
could lapse, then under section 9-403(2) the interest is never completely pro-
tected against a lien creditor. Undoubtedly, there are some situations in which
the property or transaction cannot possibly last more than five years so that the
perfection is effectively absolute. These, however, seem to be exceptional
cases. Consequently, the fact that the property or transactions often do not last
five years is no defense to the preference problem. Second, Braucher's distinc-
tion between the effect of a five-year period and a four-month one is without
support. As support for the proposition that section 9-403(2) is not preferential,
Braucher cites the absence of any cases, under the old conditional-sale and
chattel-mortgage statutes, that found preferences where a filing was effective
for only a finite time period. The problem with this argument is that most of
the old statutes did not promote a junior lien creditor upon lapse of the senior
interest. 20 ' Since the conditional seller or chattel mortgagee had absolute
priority over prelapse lien creditors, there could be no preference problem. The
lender could be sufficiently perfected as to defeat a lien creditor. It is the
elimination of this absolute priority that has engendered this preference prob-
lem.
Although neither of Braucher's arguments against characterizing condi-
tional perfection as preferential is convincing, his conclusion here seems cor-
rect. Conditional perfection should not be construed as a preference since the
preference section of the Bankruptcy Code was not aimed at the types of trans-
actions in which conditional perfection exists. Moreover, such a construction
would immediately invalidate almost all security interests presently in ex-
istence by viewing them as unperfected under the Bankruptcy Code's defini-
tion of perfection. Such a result is unacceptable. The possibility of such a con-
struction, however, while outrageous, should give pause to those who oppose
absolute perfection.
Ige 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 260-61 (1971).
"" Id.
200 Id.
2D1 See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 36, at 582-84.
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C. The Circular Priority Problem
A final factor important in the lapse of perfection area is the drafters' at-
tempt, especially in section 9-403, to avoid circular priority. 202 The problem of
circular priority is illustrated by the following example: S takes a security inter-
est in personal property and files on March 1, 1974. M takes a security interest
in the same property and files on October 1, 1975. At this point, S has priority
over M. 205 S fails to file a continuation statement before March 1, 1979,
however, so that her perfection lapses on that date. 204 On May 1, 1979, the
debtor files a bankruptcy petition, giving the trustee in bankruptcy the status of
a lien creditor as of that date. 205 If S were permitted to retain her priority over
M notwithstanding the lapse of perfection, S would beat M, 206
 M would beat
the trustee in bankruptcy, 207
 and the trustee would beat S. 208 In the bankruptcy
situation the circle is easily broken because S's avoided lien is automatically
preserved for the benefit of the estate 209 and M's interest is thereby avoided to
the extent that S could have avoided it. Thus the trustee receives first up to the
amount of S's interest, then M receives up to the amount that his interest ex-
ceeds S's, and the trustee then receives the remainder.
Outside of the bankruptcy, a true circular priority is established if a lien
creditor, L, levies on the property after S's perfection lapses. In that case, S
beats M, M beats L, and L beats S. To break this circle, it is useful to distin-
guish between the different types of circular priorities that can arise. Professor
Gilmore, in his comprehensive chapter on the topic, 21 ° suggests three possibili-
ties. The first arises when one party contractually subordinates himself to
another. For example, A, B, and C all have liens on the same property and are
entitled to priority in alphabetical order. The value of the property is insuffi-
cient to satisfy all three claims. A agrees to subordinate his claim to C. There-
fore, A has priority over B, B has priority over C, and C has priority over A, a
circular priority puzzle. Gilmore notes that this puzzle is easily solved by the
following procedure:
1. Set aside from the fund the amount of A's claim.
2. Pay the amount so set aside to
a) C, to the amount of his claim;
b) A, to the extent of any balance remaining after C's claim is
satisfied.
202 See, e.g., U.C.C.  $ 9-403, Comment 3.
7 °7
 U.C.C. $ 9-312(5).
704
 U.C.C. 5 9-403(2).
705
 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, $ 544 (a)(1), 11 U.S.C. 544(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
U.C.C. 5 9-312(5).
7° 7
 None of the trustee's avoidance powers would be effective against M's perfected
security interest. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 55 544-551, 11 U.S.C. $$ 544-551 (Supp. II
1978).
108
 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 5 544 (a)(1), 11 U.S.C. 544(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
U.C.C. $ 9-301(1)(b).
7 °8
 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 551, 11 U.S.C. 5 551 (Supp. II 1978).
210 GILMORE, supra note 36, at 1021-23. See also G. OSBORNE, THE LAW OF MORT-
GAGES 532-39 (1951) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE].
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3. Pay B the amount of the fund remaining after A's claim has been
set aside.
4. If any balance remains in the fund after A's claim has been set
aside and B's claim has been satisfied, distribute the balance to
a) C,
b) A."'
The second circular priority possibility arises when one party fails to do
some act necessary to ensure his priority over some, but not all, other claim-
ants. For example, under a mortgage filing system in which failure to file sub-
ordinates the mortgagee to subsequent mortgagees who take without knowl-
edge, but has no effect on subsequent mortgagees who take with knowledge,
the following circle can result: A takes a mortgage and fails to file; B takes a
filed mortgage on the same property with knowledge of A's interest; C takes a
filed mortgage on the same property without knowledge of A's interest. The
result is that A is prior to B, B is prior to C, and C is prior to A. This problem is
not as easily resolved as the first situation. Here Professor Gilmore favors a
variation of the subordination rule under which A would be the subordinate
party."' He reasons that since A failed to file, he was at fault and should be
subordinated. Thus A's share would be set aside for C, with the remainder, if
any, going to A. Remaining property would go first to B, then to C, if C hasn't
yet been satisfied, and then to A. There have been other solutions proposed, 21 "
but they are generally too complicated to be workable.
The third type of circular priority problem involves the operations of in-
consistent statutory schemes. Although all of the parties have acted properly
under these statutory provisions, a circle nevertheless results. A classic exam-
ple arose under the old Federal Bankruptcy Act.'" According to section
67(c)(1), certain statutory liens were subordinated to administrative expenses
and wage claims.'" These liens, however, often had priority under state law
over consensual mortgages or security interests. 216 Therefore, a circle was
created in which the lien had priority over the mortgage, the mortgage had
priority over the administrative expenses and the wage claims had priority over
the lien.
Gilmore analyzed the circular priority cases that arose after 1940, almost
all of which involved the third situation. He found that "[t]he most popular
solution" 217 was to apply the analysis used in situations involving subordina-
tion agreements.'" According to Gilmore, this analysis was utilized even in
those cases involving "true circular priorities" in which no party was at fault
and in which the circle resulted strictly from inconsistent statutory schemes.
211 GILMORE, supra note 36, at 1021.
242 Id. at 1022.
213 Sec note 222 infra.
214 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, $ 67(c)(1), 11 U.S.C. 107(c)(1) (1976).
" 5 Id.
215 GILMORE, supra note 36, at 1023.
21 Id. at 1032.
2 " Id.
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Where a circularity is due to one party's fault, it is easier to equate that party
with one who has given a subordination agreement, and to treat him accord-
ingly. Yet in the "true circular priority" cases, there is no logical basis for
determining which of the parties should be subordinated because no party
stands out as subordinated or at fault. Consequently, use of the subordination
rule causes the circle to be broken arbitrarily. The difficulty of determining
where to break the circle is illustrated by cases that contained similar fact situa-
tions but still reached different solutions. 219 Nevertheless, the fact that courts
use the subordination rule in the face of this difficulty indicates a strong
preference for this means of resolving circular priority problems.
While courts that have considered the circular priority problem prefer the
subordination rule, it is not the approach adopted by the Code drafters. In, sec-
tion 9-403(2), they purport to avoid the circular priority problem by promoting
the junior secured creditor upon lapse of the senior interest. 2" If A is the
senior, lapsed secured creditor, B the junior perfected secured creditor, and C
a lien creditor whose lien arose after A's lapse, the distribution would be to B
first, then to C, and finally to A. This approach, however, does not avoid the
circular priority problem."' Rather, it breaks the circle once it has formed by
putting B ahead of A and then ranking everyone. The question, then, is
whether this resolution is preferable to the subordination rule or some other ap-
proach.
As a preliminary matter, it would appear that the suggested approaches,
other than subordination, should be rejected. 222
 They do not provide equitable
solutions and are so complicated that they would have little practical applica-
tion in the courts. 223
There are, generally, three approaches to the circular priority problem.
Each of these provides a windfall to one of the three parties involved. In a
scenario involving a senior secured creditor whose perfection has lapsed, a
junior secured creditor whose interest arose before the lapse, and a lien creditor
whose interest arose after the lapse, the three approaches are as follows: (1) Pay
the parties in the order in which their claims arose. This, in effect, ignores the
219 id.
220 U.C.C. S 9-403(2).
221 See, e.g., OSBORNE, supra note 210, at 533.
222
	 e.g., Benson, Circuity of Lien — A Problem in Priorities, 19 MINN L. REV. 139
(1935); Kocourek, A First-Rate Legal Puzzle — A Problem in Priorities, 29 ILL. L. REV. 952 (1935);
Note, Circuity of Liens — A Proposed Solution, 38 COLust. L. REV. 1267 (1938).
2"
 The approaches generally involve some variation of the one suggested by Judge Dix-
on in Hoag v. Sayre, 33 N.J. Eq. 552 (1881). Judge Dixon's approach involved treating the
"nonguilty" parties as junior lienors. Thus, if A is a mortgagee who failed to file, B a second
mortgagee with knowledge of A's interest (i. e. , subordinate to A), and C a lien creditor (prior to
A but subordinate to B), the distribution would be made as follows:
1. Pay C the amount of the fund less B's claim.
2. Pay B the amount of the fund less A's claim.
3. Residue to A.
GitmORE, supra note 36, at 1025-26. For the three variations on this approach, see articles cited
in note 222 supra.
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lapse. Under this approach, the senior secured creditor receives first, then the
junior secured creditor, then the lien creditor. (2) Promote the junior secured
creditor upon the senior's lapse. The junior creditor receives first, then the lien
creditor, then the senior secured creditor. (3) Freeze the secured creditors'
priorities as of the time their interests arose but set aside the amount of the
senior's interest and use it to pay the lien creditor, who has priority over the
senior security interest since the lien arose after the lapse. This is the subordi-
nate rule. Under this rule, the lien creditor receives first up to the amount of
the senior secured creditor's claim. The senior will receive next if any of the
amount set aside remains, then the junior secured creditor, then the lien
creditor if any more is due him, and finally the senior secured creditor.
The first approach has the virtue of simplicity. Its justification is that the
lien creditor cannot be paid until the junior secured creditor is paid, and the
junior creditor cannot be paid until the senior has been paid. 224 The effect of
this resolution, however, is to provide a windfall for the senior secured creditor
— the party who created the problem by letting his perfection lapse. In addi-
tion, it penalizes the lien creditor who normally would have priority over the
lapsed interest. This seems to be the least acceptable of the possible approaches
since the party who caused the circle certainly should not benefit from it.
Neither of the remaining two approaches is dismissed so easily. The circle
can be broken either by promoting the junior creditor as section 9-403(2) does
or by using the subordination rule, under which the first secured party is
treated as the subordinated party. Promoting the junior secured creditor upon
a senior creditor's lapse provides a windfall to the junior creditor, since at the
time he took his interest, he expected to be subordinate. Nevertheless, the
Code's filing requirements are so simple that there is little excuse for a secured
party's failure to file a continuation statement in order to prevent a lapse. It is
arguably fair, therefore, to penalize the creditor who permits a lapse to occur.
In fact, such a penalty would provide further incentive for secured parties to
keep their filings up to date. Moreover, the lien creditor has at least construc-
tive knowledge of the junior secured creditor's interest at the time he obtains
his lien. Consequently, it seems equitable that the junior secured creditor
recovers prior to the lien creditor.
Use of the subordination rule also provides a windfall, but in this case it
would be for the lien creditor. This windfall occurs because the lien creditor
receives as much of the senior secured party's share as is necessary to satisfy his
lien. He, however, has had at least part of his claim satisfied prior to the junior
secured party's receipt of payment, even though the lien creditor expected to be
subordinate to that party. This windfall has been the major objection to the
subordination rule. Yet, in defense of this approach, it should be noted that the
two secured parties are left in the positions that they expected to be in at the
time they obtained their interests. The senior party is prior to the junior party,
thereby supporting and enhancing the operation of the filing system.
Which of these approaches is preferable depends on whether it is better to
724 OSBORNE, supra note 210, at 533.
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give a windfall to the junior secured party or to the lien creditor. This article
takes no position' on 'this question other than to note that, according to Justice
Braucher, the issue was fully debated by the Code revisers and they opted for
the former position. 225 The point of this discussion is to demonstrate that the
Code's approach in section 9-403(2) does not avoid circular priority, but rather
adopts a means of breaking the circle. Thus, if the policy of the Code is avoid-
ance of circular priorities, 226 it is no better served by its rule of conditional
priority than by an absolute priority rule. If the present Code approach creates
inconsistencies within the statutory scheme, avoidance of circular priority does
not provide a reason to retain the approach and the inconsistency.
In fact, the present approach to conditional and absolute priority does
create inconsistencies within the Code. Although section 9-403(2) provides on-
ly conditional priority to a secured creditor, section 9-103(1)(d) arguably pro-
vides absolute priority over lien creditors, albeit only conditional priority over
other secured creditors. Moreover, other Code sections, such as 9-306(3) and
9-103(1)(c), take no position on the type of priority accorded a secured creditor.
Thus the relative priorities of parties upon lapse of perfection seem unduly
dependent upon the type of lapse involved. Perhaps the various sections involv-
ing lapse can be interpreted in a manner that provides internal consistency.
This will be the subject of the remainder of this article.
III. A CONSISTENT APPROACH TO LAPSE CASES
Article 9 of the U.C.C. contains numerous provisions that potentially
result in lapse of perfection. Although superficially these provisions disclose no
logical or consistent approach to the problem, closer analysis discloses a means
of reconciling most of the provisions. It appears that although much of the
thought given to the lapse provisions involved the bankruptcy and circular
priority problems, these problems are in fact insignificant or non-existent. The
main concern of these lapse provisions should be to find the most equitable
solution to the problems raised by a lapse of perfection. Such an analysis would
take into account the source of the lapse, the types of parties competing for pay-
ment, the reasonable expectations of the parties, and the party who was in the
best position to avoid the conflict. This need not be done on a case-by-case
basis, but rather can be done for each lapse section since there are only a




Section 9-403(2) provides that a filing lapses five years after it is made if a
continuation statement is not filed prior to the lapse. Upon lapse, purchasers
and lien creditors may treat the security interest as if it had never been
225 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS at 258-59 (1971).
226 U.C.C. S 9-403, Comment 3.
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perfected. In view of the respective equities of the parties involved, section
9-403(2) contains the correct approach to this situation. Because the statute
clearly states that the filing lapses in five years and because the secured creditor
has a six-month period within which to file, 227
 there is no excuse for his failing
to file a continuation statement at the proper time. Certainly where both pre-
and post-lapse purchasers or lien creditors exist, creating a potential circular
priority problem, the approach of 9-403(2) is sensible. It penalizes the lapsed
creditor, who could have filed with ease, rather than the other innocent
parties. 228
Where only a pre-lapse purchaser or lien creditor and the lapsed secured
creditor are competing, however, section 9-403(2) is not as easily justified.
Since the pre-lapse party took with at least constructive , knowledge of the
security interest, the respective rights arguably should be frozen as of that time.
On the other hand, the pre-lapse purchaser or creditor should be entitled to
assume that the failure to file a continuation statement indicates that the senior
party is no longer claiming any interest in the property. Perhaps an even more
compelling reason to promote the junior party in such a situation is the difficul-
ty of administering different rules depending on the number of claimants or the
times the claims arose. It seems appropriate, therefore, to promote purchasers
and lien creditors when a filing lapses under the five-year rule.
Section 9-403(2) 229 also resolves any problem that might arise concerning
the trustee in bankruptcy's status as a lien creditor by continuing perfection
until after termination of a bankruptcy proceeding. Consequently, those few
cases230 that promoted the trustee upon lapse are no longer viable. Hopefully
any preference argument with respect to 9-403(2) will be rejected as well."'
Admittedly, the conditional priority of this provision offers support to the
preference argument because with such priority, the secured creditor is never
completely perfected against a lien creditor. 232 Nevertheless, a reasonable in-
terpretation of the Bankruptcy Code will permit security interests perfected
under 9-403(2) to survive bankruptcy. 233
Section 9-403(2) elects a circular priority solution under which a secured
creditor after lapse becomes subordinate to all parties who have priority over
an unsecured creditor. This approach permits a purchaser or lien creditor —
227 The secured party does not need the debtor's signature on the continuation state-
ment. U.C.C. § 9-402(2)(a).
229 In this context, an innocent party is one who uses sound business practices and has
reasonable expectations.
229 U.C.C. 5 9-403(2) provides:
If a security interest perfected by filing exists at the time insolvency proceedings
are commenced by or against the debtor, the security interest remains perfected
until termination of the insolvency proceedings and thereafter for a period of sixty
days or until expiration of the five year period, whichever occurs later.
Id.
239 See cases cited in notes 169 & 170 supra.
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aside from a trustee in bankruptcy — to receive a windfall, even though they
expected to be subordinate. Given the ease with which the secured creditor
could prevent a lapse, this does not seem at all inappropriate.
2. Section 9-103
a. Section 9-103(1)(d)
Section 9-103(1)(d) provides that if collateral subject to a perfected securi-
ty interest is moved from one jurisdiction to another, the security interest re-
mains perfected for four months after the collateral arrives in the new jurisdic-
tion, and thereafter if the security interest is reperfected in the new jurisdiction.
If the security interest is not reperfected during the four-month period, it
becomes unperfected at the end of the period and is then deemed to have been
unperfected as against a purchaser whose interest arose during the period. 234
The respective equities of the parties are different in this section than in
section 9-403, the filing lapse provision. Under 9-403, the secured party would
or should know at all times exactly when lapse would occur if a refiling was not
made. 235
 Thus, since a secured party could easily avoid lapse under this five-
year rule, he deserves little protection from the effect of a lapse. 796
 The secured
creditor is not as likely to know about a 9-103(1)(d) lapse, however, which
would be caused by moving the goods from one jurisdiction to another. Unless
the secured creditor is constantly policing his collateral, it is possible for a debt-
or to move the collateral and for the secured creditor to fail to learn of the move
for some time. Moreover, where a financially desperate or unscrupulous debt-
or is involved, the collateral not only may be moved, but also may be sold or
used as collateral for a loan in the new jurisdiction. Since there will be no filing
in the new jurisdiction, a purchaser who relies on the files will not know of the
security interest. The Code drafters felt that the risk that an innocent purchaser
might be misled during the four-month period was an acceptable risk and
necessary to ensure the secured creditor a reasonable time within which to
act. 237 The protection for the purchaser would lie in his investigation of the re-
cent history of the collateral. The four-month period of continued perfection,
does, to some extent, interfere with the integrity of the filing system, however,
and it does not seem unreasonable to require a secured creditor who is claiming
the benefit of this period against a party who may have relied on the filing
system to maintain sufficient interest in his collateral so that he would learn of
the move and act within four months. In balancing the equities of the secured
creditor and the purchaser, it is appropriate that the purchaser be permitted to
defeat a secured creditor who is not diligent enough to act within four months.
Section 9-103(1)(d) does this by deeming the security interest that is not
reperfected within four months as having been unperfected during the four-
month period.
This reasoning is not as persuasive when the intervening party is a lien
"4 See Part I-A-2 supra.
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text at notes 227-28 supra.
"6 Id.
27 U.C.C. S 9-103, Comment 7.
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creditor. The lien creditor is not a "reliance creditor" because credit is typical-
ly not extended by him based on the absence of filings against the debtor.
Rather, the lien creditor, by extending credit without security, undertakes the
risk that no unencumbered property will be available to satisfy his claim. Even
if the lien creditor relies on an absence of filings in extending credit, it is still
unlikely that there will be reliance, or any meaningful change in position,
based on the state of the files at the time of levy. Since a secured creditor's
failure to refile in a new jurisdiction is unlikely to mislead a lien creditor, there
is little reason to promote a lien creditor whose lien arose during the four-
month temporary perfection period. The secured creditor is not likely to have
learned that the collateral has been moved; the Code has given him a four-
month period of perfection; the lien creditor is not likely to have relied on the
files. Therefore, it is appropriate to give the secured creditor absolute priority
over lien creditors under section 9-103(1)(d).
Absolute priority over a lien creditor avoids the potential, albeit unlikely,
bankruptcy problems that were discussed previously. 238 A circular priority
could arise, however, where the secured party fails to refile in the new jurisdic-
tion, a creditor levies on the property, and a purchaser takes an interest sub-
sequent to the levy, but within the four-month period. In this case, the secured
party has priority over the lien creditor, the lien creditor has priority over the
purchaser, and the purchaser has priority over the secured party. The circle
should be broken by using the subordination rule. Thus the secured party's
share should be set aside and paid to the purchaser, with any remainder paid to
the secured party. The lien creditor should be paid next, then the purchaser,
and lastly the secured party, to the extent the purchaser and secured party were
unsatisfied in the initial distribution. This solution is preferable to that pro-
vided by conditional priority, which would involve paying the lien creditor,
then the purchaser, then the secured party. Certainly, as a nonreliance
creditor, the lien creditor should not receive a windfall. He obtained a lien sub-
ject to a security interest and his lien should not be paid until an amount equal
to the value of the security interest is set aside. This view is strengthened by the
difficulty that the secured party may have in learning of the collateral's
removal. Furthermore, although the purchaser is subordinate to the lien
creditor ; it is appropriate to permit the former to receive a windfall by paying
him before the lien creditor. Since he is not taking any proceeds that the lien
creditor expected to receive, and since the purchaser could not know of the
security interest before the filing, he is the most innocent of the three. If some-
one must receive a windfall, the purchaser is the strongest candidate in this
situation.
In section 9-103(1)(d), therefore, the drafters reached an equitable solu-
tion in granting the secured creditor only conditional priority over a purchaser.
It seems appropriate, however, to allow the secured creditor absolute rather
than conditional priority over lien creditors; although the Code does not speci-
fically address this issue. Absolute priority may result in a circular priority, but
it can be resolved by use of the subordination rule.
" 8 See text at notes 162-201 supra.
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b. Section 9-103(1Xc)
Section 9-103(1)(c) provides that if parties who create a purchase money
security interest in goods understand at the time of attachment that the goods
are to be kept in another jurisdiction, the law of that other jurisdiction governs
perfection matters for thirty days after the debtor receives possession of the
goods and thereafter if the goods are brought into the other jurisdiction before
the end of the thirty-day period. The lapse question involves the effect on
parties whose interests arose during the thirty-day period of a failure of the
goods to arrive in the new jurisdiction before the end of the period. Thus,
assuming the secured creditor filed in the new jurisdiction, that state's law
would govern perfection requirements and the interest would be perfected dur-
ing the thirty-day period. At the end of the period, however, that state's law
would cease to apply and the perfection would lapse. If a purchaser or lien
creditor obtained an interest before the lapse that would be subordinate to the
security interest at that time, the effect of the lapse on the competing party is
unclear.
While the Code fails to resolve this issue, reference to the respective
equities of the parties suggests an answer. The short duration of the transaction
indicates that the secured creditor should be carefully monitoring the location
of the goods. If it appears that the goods will not arrive in the new jurisdiction
in time, the diligent secured creditor can refile wherever the goods are and pre-
vent a lapse. 239
 Alternatively, and more realistically, the creditor initially can
file both in the jurisdiction to which the goods are headed and in the jurisdic-
tion where the goods are when the security interest attaches. 24° Whichever op-
tion he selects, it is a lesser burden for the secured creditor to police the col-
lateral for thirty days than for the life of a security interest. Consequently, since
his burden is minimal, extensive protection of the secured creditor's interest is
not necessary. For example, a purchaser who takes an interest in the goods
while they are in the original jurisdiction, and who relied on the absence of a
filing in the original jurisdiction, should prevail over the secured creditor if the
creditor fails to ensure compliance with section 9-103(1)(c).
Because of the different burden on the secured creditor, the position of the
lien creditor under section 9-103(I)(c) would seem to fall somewhere between
that creditor's position in section 9-403(2), where the secured creditor always
knows when the five years will expire and his filing will lapse, and section
9-103(1)(d), under which the secured creditor has greater difficulty learning
when a lapse has resulted from movement of the collateral to another jurisdic-
tion. Since the burden is greater on the secured creditor in 9-103(1)(c) than in
9-403(2), conceivably the lien creditor, who presumably has not relied on the
files, should not be promoted over the lapsed secured creditor. Yet the secured
creditor's burden is less cumbersome under 9-103(1)(c) than under
9-103(1)(d). Thus it can be argued that a different result should ensue in the
two sections and the lien creditor should be promoted over the lapsed creditor.
239 U.C.C. 5 9-103, Comment 3.
zilo
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Of these two possible approaches, the latter has the most appeal. The perfec-
tion requirements are so easily complied with that it is fair to penalize one who
fails to comply rather than an innocent third party.
The proposed conditional priority for the secured creditor under section
9-103(1)(c) resolves the circular priority problem by placing any interests aris-
ing during the thirty-day period ahead of the secured party. This is appropriate
because the secured creditor, by policing the collateral, is in the best position to
prevent the problem. Conditional priority under this provision does raise the
spectre of bankruptcy problems, 241 however, particularly since the initial
perfection is for only thirty days. If bankruptcy occurs during the thirty-day
period, the trustee could assert lien creditor status to defeat the security interest
when the period expires and perfection lapses.'" If bankruptcy occurs after the
thirty-day period, the trustee in bankruptcy may argue that since the transfer is
not fully perfected against a lien creditor until the goods arrive in the new juris-
diction, the transfer is on account of an antecedent debt and is preferentia1. 243
These bankruptcy problems may be solved by multiple filings that assure the
secured creditor continuous perfection. 244 Beyond that, reliance must be placed
on a reasonable approach by courts construing bankruptcy law. The bankrupt-
cy arguments are not meritorious245 and should not be the basis for deciding
important policy issues. In conclusion, under the thirty-day rule of section
9-103(1)(c), the Code fails to resolve whether conditional or absolute priority is
to be granted a secured creditor upon lapse of perfection. Equitable considera-
tions suggest that the secured creditor be allowed only a conditional priority
over a purchaser or lien creditor whose interest arose during the thirty-day
period of perfection. While conditional priority under this Code provision may
result in a bankruptcy problem, such a factor should not be determinative in
resolving the issue of priority in section 9-103(1)(c).
c. Section 9-103(2)
Perfection of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title
may lapse because the certificate is surrendered,'" or because the goods are re-
registered in another jurisdiction and four months have elapsed since their
removal from the original jurisdiction. 247
 If a purchaser or lien creditor obtains
an interest in the goods prior to the lapse, the effect of the lapse on that party
may be determined by considering the respective equities of the parties in-
volved.
The secured creditor is in a position to prevent a lapse resulting from sur-
render of the certificate because he can and generally will retain possession of
2" See text at notes 162-201 supra.
2" See text at notes 162-84 supra.
2" See text at notes 185-201 supra.
244 U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 3.
"' See text at notes 181 & 201 supra.
246 U.C.C. S 9-103(2)(b).
247 Id. The effect of perfection lapses as against a nonprofessional buyer if a clean cer-
tificate is issued in the new jurisdiction. U.C.C. S 9-103(2)(d).
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the certificate of title on which his lien is noted.'" It is substantially more dif-
ficult to prevent a lapse through reregistration since the secured creditor will
rely on the new state's registering authority which may not always operate ef-
ficiently. In addition, although the creditor has four months after removal to
reperfect, he may not learn in time that the goods have been removed from the
original jurisdiction.'" Further, even if he knows the goods have been removed
— as he might, for example, if the debtor stopped making payments — he
must also find out where they have been taken. This task in itself will be dif-
ficult.
These burdens of the secured creditor can be contrasted with those of the
three types of purchasers who might take an interest in the goods: lenders, pro-
fessional buyers, and nonprofessional buyers. Lenders and professional buyers
typically are sophisticated parties who can be expected to understand the com-
plications concerning interstate movement of certain goods and the resulting
rules. Moreover, it usually will be easier for such parties to review the recent
history of the vehicle than for the secured party to learn of the movement and
reperfect immediately. It seems fair, therefore, to put a burden on such parties
to investigate carefully before acting. In keeping with this. view, section
9-103(2) does favor the original secured party over an intervening lender or
professional buyer in some circumstances. 2" In particular, the lender or pro-
fessional buyer does not receive the protection under the Code that a non-
professional buyer receives when he relies on a clean certificate of title. 25 ' The
drafters apparently assumed that professionals would not be misled by a clean
certificate.
Beyond the rules concerning clean certificates, however, the secured party
who fails to reperfect within four months or before reregistration, whichever is
later, seems to receive little protection against any intervening buyers or
lenders, whether or not they are professionals. If the vehicle is moved from a
noncertificate state to a certificate state, section 9-103(2)(c) refers to the four-
month rule of 9-103(1)(d). 252 If the vehicle is moved from a certificate state to
either a certificate or noncertificate state, section 9-103(2)(b) provides that after
the later of four months or reregistration — or in any event after surrender of
the certificate — the goods are no longer covered by a certificate of title. Thus,
either 9-103(3) or, more commonly, the four-month rule of 9-103(1)(d) will
govern.'" If the four-month rule of 9-301(1)(d) is applied, the secured party
24B U.C.C. 9-103, Comment 4(c).
2" See, e.g., In the Matter of White, 266 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf. In re Den-
nis Mitchell Industries, Inc., 419 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1969) (secured creditor failed to learn of
movement of equipment until long after move).
250 U.C.C. 5 9- 103(2)(d).
2" Id.
252 U.C.C. 5 9- 103(2)(c).
253
	
9-103(3) will apply if the vehicle is equipment or inventory leased or held for
lease. U.C.C. 5 9-103(3)(a). In that case, the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located
will govern perfection requirements. This raises another complex lapse issue. Suppose a third
party takes an interest in the vehicle while it was covered by a certificate of title. If perfection
under the certificate lapses and the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located takes
over, perfection is likely to lapse. The question is whether the third-party interest that formerly
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who fails to reperfect in time is subordinated to any purchaser whose interest
arose after the goods were moved, even though the secured party was con-
sidered perfected at the time the interest arose.'" Moreover, if the perfection
lapses because the secured party surrenders the certificate and fails to reperfect,
section 9-103(1)(d) again will promote an intervening purchaser because the
period of perfection in the original jurisdiction will have expired.
It is unclear why section 9-103(2) refers back to 9-103(1)(d) for the rights
of intervening purchasers instead of providing its own rules. While the two sec-
tions deal with similar problems, there are some substantial differences. Unlike
the typical fact situation arising under 9-103(1)(d), a professional lender or
buyer is on notice that the recent history of goods covered by a certificate of title
should be investigated carefully. In addition, it may be much more difficult for
a secured creditor to police the easily moveable collateral covered by 9-103(2)
than it would be for him to guard the type of collateral usually covered by
9-103(1)(d). Thus, rather than the 9-103(1)(d) conditional protection, the
equities favor absolute protection under 9-103(2) for secured creditors against
professional tenders and buyers during the period in which the original perfec-
tion is effective. Section 9-103(2) should either be amended or interpreted to
provide such protection.'"
Where the competing claimant is a nonprofessional buyer, however, the
drafters of 9-103(2) resolved the priority issue correctly. A nonprofessional
buyer is not likely to know or understand the complex conflicts rules involved.
Thus, section 9-103(2) protects such a buyer when he relies on a clean cer-
tificate.'" This will cover many of the cases involving nonprofessionals. Never-
theless, where the certificate is not clean, or where there is no certificate, even
the nonprofessional should be required to protect himself, atleast initially. Sec-
tion 9-103(2) requires the nonprofessional buyer to act responsibly by permit-
ting the secured creditor's perfection to continue until the certificate is sur-
rendered or until the later of four months or reregistration. If the secured
creditor fails to reperfect, the nonprofessional buyer will be promoted upon the
lapse under the four-month rule of 9-103(1)(d). This conditional priority is
more acceptable when nonprofessional buyers are concerned, since they
typically have little sophistication. As between the nonprofessional buyer and
the secured party, the greater burden should be placed on the secured party.
Where the competing claimant is a lien creditor levying after the goods are
was subordinate would be promoted or whether the rights would be frozen as of the time the in-
terest arose. Section 9-103(3) does not contain a rule comparable to the four-month rule of sec-
tion 9-103(1)(d). It may, nevertheless, in the unlikely event that this situation were to arise, be
easiest to apply the four-Month rule in the same manner that it would be applied if the goods were
not mobile goods.
224 	S 9-103(1)(d). See text at note 74 supra.
225 Arguably the section should provide absolute protection only if the certificate is not
surrendered. Since the secured party generally holds the certificate, he will know when it is sur-
rendered and can take appropriate steps to reperfect in the new jurisdiction. If he fails to do so, it
seems proper to penalize him. Fortunately, this situation is not likely to occur often because it is
so easily avoidable.
226 U.C.C. S 9-103(2)(d).
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moved but during the period in which the secured creditor's perfection con-
tinues, the levying creditor is subordinate to the security interest. 257 The
secured creditor apparently would retain priority over the lien creditor even if
perfection subsequently lapses. 259
 While this reading is not clear on the face of
the statute, section 9-103(2) seems to refer back to 9-103(1)(d) which apparent-
ly grants absolute perfection. 259 When the competing claimant is a lien
creditor, absolute protection is even more appropriate under 9-103(2) than
under 9-103(1). The secured creditor is in a more difficult position when the
collateral is as easily moveable as that involved in 9-103(2) situations and
generally will not be able to police it effectively. Moreover, the lien creditor has
not relied on the existence of this property, and there is no reason to provide
him with a windfall.
Thus section 9-103(2), dealing with the perfection of a security interest in
goods covered by a certificate of title, grants a secured creditor only conditional
priority against any type of purchaser and fails to specify the secured creditor's
status with respect to a lien creditor. A consideration of the parties' equities in-
dicates that while this Code provision rightly accords the secured creditor con-
ditional priority over the nonprofessional purchaser, it should grant the
secured creditor absolute priority where a professional purchaser, professional
lender or lien creditor is the competing party. This grant of absolute priority
would prevent the bankruptcy problems discussed previously, which arise
when a secured creditor has only conditional priority over lien creditors. A cir-
cular priority problem could arise, however, and if so, it should be resolved as
under 9-103(1)(d), with the subordination rule. 26°
3. Section 9-305
Section 9-305 provides that a security interest in certain collateral may be
perfected by taking possession of the collateral. Perfection lapses when the
secured creditor surrenders possession. In general, the secured party will not
surrender possession until he is paid by the debtor and the transaction is ended.
A third party who obtains an interest in the collateral while the secured party is
perfected will no longer be competing with the secured party and no lapse
problem arises. However, if the secured party surrenders possession to the
debtor while he still claims a security interest, his interest becomes unperfected
and junior secured creditors or lien creditors may now claim priority over him.
The secured creditor who perfects by possession should be treated in the
same manner as one who perfects by filing and permits a lapse under section
9-403(2). 26 ' In both situations the secured creditor knows exactly when lapse
will occur and can protect himself. 262 Therefore, the conditional priority ap-
2" U.C.C. SS 9-103(2)(b), (d).
2" See text at notes 110-11 supra.
239 Id.
266 See text following note 238 supra.
261 See text at notes 227-33 supra.
262 The secured creditor can protect himself by retaining possession of the collateral. If
the collateral is goods, negotiable documents, or chattel paper, the secured creditor can prevent a
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proach of 9-403(2) should be read into 9-305. Since section 9-305 is silent on
the lapse issue, conditional priority does no violence to the statute. Moreover,
it permits internal consistency with the treatment of lapse in the other major
means of perfection, filing.
As with conditional priority in 9-403(2), this interpretation could present
problems with a trustee in bankruptcy. 263
 If the secured creditor surrenders
possession after the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee could
assert priority as a lien creditor.'" However, if rights are frozen on the date of
bankruptcy, this would not be a problem. 265 Similarly, potential preference
problems should be dismissed as lacking merit. 266 Finally, the potential circular
priority is resolved as in 9-403(2) by putting the lapsed creditor last. 267
B. Temporary Automatic Perfection
1. Section 9-306(3)
A perfected security interest in collateral becomes a perfected security in-
terest in the proceeds of that collateral.'" The proceeds interest is automatical-
ly perfected for ten days and thereafter, if certain requirements are met. 269
Where these requirements are not met prior to the end of the ten-day period,
the proceeds perfection lapses. As against a purchaser or lien creditor whose in-
terest arises after the lapse, the interest in proceeds then is treated as unper-
fected. If a purchaser or lien creditor's interest arises during the ten-day
period, however, the Code does not specify who has priority upon a lapse of
perfection. Yet, the respective equities of the parties once again may provide a
resolution of the resulting priority dispute.
It should first be noted that a perfection lapse and subsequent priority dis-
pute can occur under 9-306(3) only in the presence of one of the following con-
ditions: (a) if the proceeds are not a type of collateral that could have a security
interest perfected by a filing in the same office as the original filing, (b) if the
proceeds are not cash proceeds, or (c) if the proceeds are acquired with cash
proceeds and are not described in the original financing statment. 2 " In most
situations, therefore, perfection in proceeds will be automatic and extend
beyond the ten-day period. Thus, the secured party will not need to take any
additional measures to maintain perfection and priority will not be an issue.
When perfection is not automatic, however, the secured creditor must file
a new financing statement before the end of the ten-day period. 271 Here, the
lapse by filing a financing statement prior to surrendering possession. Perfection will then be con-
tinuous. U.C.C. 5 9303(2).
263 See text at notes 162-201 supra.
2" See text at notes 162-84 supra.
262 text at note 165 supra.
266 See text at notes 198-201 supra.
267
	 text following note 233 supra.
266
	 55 9-306(2), 9-306(3).
265 See text at notes 120-27 supra.
270 U.C.C. 5 9-306(3).
271 U.C.C. 5 9-306(3)(c).
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burden on the secured creditor depends on the nature of the transaction. For
example, a creditor with a floating lien on inventory generally knows that at
least some of the proceeds are likely to be accounts. If the debtor and the inven-
tory are located in different jurisdictions, the secured creditor should know that
an accounts filing will be necessary in the debtor's location. 272 Consequently,
the burden on the secured creditor is small. Yet in the less likely situation in
which the debtor sells inventory, receives cash, and uses the cash to buy equip-
ment, 273
 the requirement that the secured creditor have filed for equipment
may indeed be quite burdensome because he may not know about the entire
transaction.
The effect on purchasers will also depend on the transaction. For instance,
a purchaser of accounts who finds no filing at the debtor's location nevertheless
might look in the jurisdiction where the debtor's inventory is located. In this
situation, the secured creditor's failure to file as to proceeds is not
unreasonably misleading. The secured creditor's failure to file as to equipment
obtained with cash proceeds, however, may be seriously misleading.
Thus in balancing the respective equities of the secured party and a pur-
chaser, a case-by-case analysis may seem appropriate at first. Yet this would
lead to different results under section 9-306(3). While this could produce the
most equitable solutions, it could easily lead to nonuniform interpretations as
various jurisdictions balance the equities differently. Such an analysis also
would reduce the ability of parties to predict results under the statute. These
two adverse effects suggest that a uniform approach to lapse under section
9-306(3) is necessary. Since there will be situations in which the secured party
will have difficulty learning that he should file as to proceeds, 274
 and the period
of temporary perfection is so short, the sole approach proposed here is that the
secured party should be given absolute priority during this period. This conclu-
sion does not contradict the statute, which lacks any direction on the matter.
The Code drafters explicitly mandated conditional priority in several
contexts. 275
 Therefore, their failure to mention it here may imply that absolute
priority was intended. In addition, the nature of temporary automatic perfec-
tion is such that it should provide absolute protection. The value of the perfec-
tion is small indeed if upon lapse after a mere ten days it is treated as having
never existed.
Similar grounds support absolute priority against lien creditors whose in-
terests arise during the ten-day period. The period is short, the secured creditor
may need more time to learn that he must file, and, further, the lien creditor as
a nonreliance creditor need not be favored. Again, absolute priority avoids
potential bankruptcy problems. 276
 Any circular priority could be resolved by
using the subordination rule, as under 9-103. 2"
2" U.C.C. §§ 9-103(3), 9-302, 9-306(3).
"3 This assumes that the secured creditor can trace the proceeds all the way to the
equipment, a not inconsiderable burden.
"4 See text at note 273 supra.
275 See, e.g., U.C.C. S 9-403(2) (subordinate parties promoted upon lapse); $ 9.103(1)(d)
(subordinate purchaser promoted upon lapse where goods are moved to new jurisdiction).
"6 See Parts II-A and II-B supra.
27 See Part II-C supra.
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2. Section 9-304
Section 9-304(4) provides a twenty-one-day period of automatic perfection
for instruments or negotiable documents where the security interest is for new
value given under a written security agreement. Section 9-304(5) establishes a
similar twenty-one-day period of automatic perfection without filing for
previously perfected security interests in instruments, negotiable documents,
or goods not covered by a negotiable document but in the possession of a
bailee. This latter section is employed where the collateral is released to the
debtor for certain legitimate reasons. 278
The periods of automatic perfection specified in 9-304(4) and (5) are in-
tended to permit certain common, short-term transactions without requiring
filings. 279 In view of this underlying purpose, perfection during the temporary
period should be absolute as against third parties. The secured party is invited
to forego filing during this period and should not be penalized for doing so,
particularly in transactions that may extend just a few days beyond the twenty-
one-day period. Another reason for not denying the secured party absolute
priority is the existence of three sanctions, which may be imposed on a secured
party who allows the transaction to extend beyond the twenty-one days without
filing. These sanctions are as follows: (1) there may be a preference if a bank-
ruptcy petition is filed; 28° (2) a third party whose interest arises after the twenty-
one-day period is subject to an unperfected interest; 2 " and (3) certain parties,
such as a purchase money secured creditor, will defeat the secured party even if
the interest is considered perfected. 282 The third sanction, the defeat of a per-
fected security interest by certain parties, coupled with the shortness of the
period, reduces any unfairness to third parties. Lien creditors, particularly the
trustee in bankruptcy, may be adversely affected by being subordinated to a
"secret" security interest, but they are not reliance creditors and, again, the
period of automatic perfection is very brief. Therefore, this period should be
considered to be one of absolute perfection for the secured creditor as against
both purchasers and lien creditors.
CONCLUSION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code contains a variety of instances
in which protection of a security interest may lapse. If protection lapses, there
"8 The automatic perfection occurs under U.C.C. 5 9-304(5) when the secured party
(a) makes available to the debtor the goods or documents.representing the goods
for the purpose of ultimate sale or exchange or for the purpose of loading,
unloading, storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing, processing or
otherwise dealing with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or ex-
change, but priority between conflicting security interests in the goods is sub-
ject to subsection (3) of Section 9-312; or
(b) delivers the instruments to the debtor for the purpose of ultimate sale or ex-
change or of presentation, collection, renewal or registration of transfer.
U.C.C. 9-304(5).
279 See, e.g., U.C.C. 5 9-304, Comment 4; WHITE& SUMMERS, 2d ed., supra note 105,
at 928-33; GILMORE, supra note 36, at 455-61.




 See, e.g., U.C.C. 9-312(3).
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may be problems concerning the rights of parties whose interests arose prior to
the lapse and who were subordinate to the secured creditor at that time.
Although some of the relevant sections"' contain rules for resolving the rights
of pre-lapse creditors, these rules apparently have not been developed with an
eye towards the lapse problem. Rather, their aim has been to short-circuit cer-
tain bankruptcy and circular priority problems that are unlikely to arise. 284
Moreover, many Code sections involving lapse contain no guidance concern-
ing the rights of pre-lapse creditors."'
The Code can be interpreted to provide efficient equitable rules on the ef-
fect of lapse. Arriving at such an interpretation involves a study of the respec-
tive equities of each party. It is necessary to consider the source of the lapse, the
types of parties competing for priority, and the reasonable expectations of the
parties. This article has presented such an analysis and applied it to the rele-
vant Code sections in a manner that supports the purposes and policies behind
the sections. It is to be hoped that this analysis can provide a consistent ap-
proach to the lapse dilemmas that arise under article 9.
2S See, e.g., U .C.0 . SS 9-403(2), 9-103(I)(d), 9-103(2).
284 See Part 11 supra.
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